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Abstract
This Article attempts to explain and justify the exceptional treatment that courts
accord foreign affairs issues under the political question doctrine. For the most
part, academic commentators have attacked the political question doctrine,
arguing that the doctrine is both incoherent and inconsistent with the Marbury
tradition of judicial review. Challenging the conventional academic wisdom, this
Article contends that institutional competence considerations continue to warrant
broad application of the doctrine in the foreign affairs context. More specifically,
this Article argues that the power-based nature of most international policy
decisions continues to constrain the power of the courts to adjudicate on foreign
affairs controversies. Nonetheless, the mere involvement of foreign affairs in a
legal dispute should not automatically preclude judicial review. Rather, this
Article suggests an alternative vision of the judicial function in foreign affairs,
which I call the balance of institutional competencies approach. This approach
envisions a spectrum of judicial authority in foreign affairs, which depends on
whether the underlying foreign affairs controversy implicates individual rights or
domestic property interests, or whether Congress has legislated on the particular
foreign affairs issue in question. When viewed as a device for the proper
allocation of institutional competencies in foreign affairs disputes, this Article
contends that the political question doctrine is both doctrinally coherent and, in
the proper circumstances, normatively attractive.
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INTRODUCTION
The judicial treatment of foreign affairs is in a muddle. Since the early nineteenth
century, the courts have developed special doctrines of abstention and deference to
ensure minimal judicial intervention in foreign affairs disputes. Today, these doctrines are
under siege. Some commentators have even pronounced the heartland of judicial
abstention – the doctrine of political questions – a dead letter.1 While the reports of the
doctrine’s demise in foreign affairs are greatly exaggerated, 2 its judicial application is
replete with so many inconsistencies that its basic contours remain ill-defined and
incoherent.3
In law, doctrinal confusion breeds doctrinal contempt. Most recently, in the wake
of the President’s efforts to combat international terrorism, debates about the scope of the
judicial function in foreign affairs and national security have once again come to the fore.4
Increasingly, a growing number of voices in the academy, including those of the most
prominent foreign affairs scholars, have argued that there is no longer any justification for
the special treatment courts accord foreign affairs controversies.5 Some of these
1

See e.g., William N. Eskridge, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law
in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2308 (2002) (observing that “the decline of the political
question doctrine. . . has been pervasive in all kinds of cases”); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court?
The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, (2002)
(chronicling the demise of the political question doctrine and suggesting that Court’s refusal to invoke the
doctrine in the 2000 presidential election cases marked the nadir of the doctrine as a constraint on judicial
review).
2
See PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS 444 (4th ed. 1998) (“Though successful resort to the political question doctrine in purely
domestic disputes is rare, the doctrine appears to have greater vitality in foreign affairs.”).
3
In a recent decision in the First Circuit, for instance, the court referred to the political question’s
incoherence as grounds for declining to apply it to a claim challenging the constitutionality of the
President’s decision to initiate war with Iraq. See Doe v. Bush, No. 03-1266, 2003 WL 1093975, at *6 (1st
Cir. March 12, 2003) (observing that “the political question doctrine—that courts should not intervene in
questions that are the province of the legislative and executive branches—is a famously murky one.”). The
court ultimately decided not to review the claim on ripeness grounds. Id. at * 7 -*8. See also Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (“That the contours of the
doctrine are murky and unsettled is shown by the lack of consensus about its meaning among the members
of the Supreme Court”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.6, at 144 (3d ed.1999) (“In
many ways, the political question doctrine is the most confusing of the justiciability doctrines.”).
4
See, e.g., David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2003) (criticizing the government’s position that the courts cannot review the
President’s decision to detain foreign nationals and U.S. citizens who are terrorist suspects indefinitely,
without a hearing, and without access to counsel); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War,
Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1309-10 (2002) (arguing that the federal
courts should have a role in reviewing the decisions of the military tribunals recently established as part of
the war against terrorism).
5
Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs Constitution), 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 675-80
(2002) (arguing that globalization has made political question doctrine in foreign affairs irrelevant);
THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 4-5 (1992) (arguing that the prudential
and constitutional considerations underpinning the political question doctrine in foreign affairs are wrong
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commentators have even proposed that the courts scrap the application of the political
question doctrine in foreign affairs altogether,6 while others have argued that the scope of
the doctrine should be severely restricted.7 These critics, particularly academics,
concentrate their attacks on those instances where the courts apply the political question
doctrine to avoid addressing constitutional questions about the allocation of foreign
affairs powers.8
These critics are wrong. Foreign affairs is different. And while the courts’ current
explanations for the practice of judicial abstention or deference in foreign affairs are
indeed inadequate, the judicial conclusion that the doctrine remains viable in foreign
affairs is correct. In this Article, I suggest an alternative vision of the judicial function in
foreign affairs – the balance of institutional competencies model – that provides a
definition of the proper contours of judicial abstention and deference in constitutional
foreign affairs controversies.
In contrast to other explanations that may rely purely on textual, structural, or
other prudential factors, this model explains why the courts should continue to apply the
political question doctrine to foreign affairs issues even as the doctrine declines in the
domestic arena. Drawing on insights from international relations and the early
constitutional history of the foreign affairs powers, the model demonstrates that compared
to the political branches, the courts suffer from peculiar institutional disadvantages that
often warrant absolute deference to the decision of the political branches in most foreign
affairs controversies. First, and most significantly, compared to the political branches, the
courts lack the institutional resources or capacity to track the evolution of international
norms that govern the meaning of the terms underlying the foreign affairs powers. Second,
the general presumption of institutional legitimacy the courts enjoy when they adjudicate
on domestic constitutional questions does not extend to foreign affairs controversies.
Third, unlike in the domestic context, the costs of judicial intervention in the foreign
affairs context seriously outweigh any of its purported benefits.
and the doctrine should be abolished); Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question
Doctrine, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 814, 815 (1989) (“In modern American society, these justifications for judicial
abstention [under the political question doctrine] seem increasingly to be calls for judicial abdication”).
6
See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note __ at 4-5; HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 221-24 (1990); Glennon, supra note
__ at 815-16; Louis Henkin, Lexical Priority or “Political Question”: A Response, 101 HARV. L. REV. 524, 52931 (1987); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1033
(1985); Sinard, supra note __ at 306.
7
See, e.g., Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of Foreign
Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 219 (1985) (“The doctrine should have essentially no application
outside of foreign relations and, although theoretically applicable to some foreign affairs controversies, its
practical utility even in that area should be negligible.”)
8
See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note __, at 36-38 (arguing that the courts should be the umpires in all
allocation of foreign affairs powers disputes); Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, The ‘Political Question
Doctrine,’ and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA LAW REV. 1135 (1970) (arguing that courts have a constitutional
duty to decide the allocation of war-powers authority).
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In addition, this model provides a framework for discerning those constitutional
foreign affairs controversies that deserve judicial abstention, as opposed to those that
deserve judicial deference. In the main, the model treats the doctrines of abstention and
deference as inextricably related and as involving differences in degree, rather than
differences in kind. Framed in this manner, the balance of institutional competencies
envisions a spectrum of judicial authority in foreign affairs, which depends on whether the
underlying foreign affairs controversy implicates individual rights or domestic property
interests, or whether Congress has legislated on the particular foreign affairs issue in
question. By adopting this framework, this model explicitly rejects an analysis that
attempts to draw bright-line boundaries between judicial abstention and deference in
foreign affairs.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a critical examination of the
current state of the political question doctrine in foreign affairs. Part II demonstrates that
the critics of the political question doctrine in foreign affairs have not provided a
coherent reason for abandoning or significantly curtailing the doctrine in foreign affairs.
Part III outlines an alternative model of judicial abstention or deference in foreign affairs
that relies on a balance of institutional competencies model. This Part first points out the
comparative disadvantages that the judicial branch faces when it tries to resolve
constitutional foreign affairs controversies. This Part then suggests a different lens for
understanding the judicial function in foreign affairs controversies, which helps to define
the scope of judicial abstention and deference in such controversies. Two important
examples demonstrate the efficacy of this approach: individual rights claims that
challenge foreign policy decisions; and the judicial construction of statutes where
Congress has legislated in a foreign affairs area that the courts normally abstain from
under the political question doctrine.
One caveat: This Article does not purport to explain the judicial function in all
spheres of foreign affairs law. For the most part, the focus of this Article is on the
constitutional law of foreign affairs, and it does not discuss other realms of foreign affairs
law, such as the act of state doctrine, customary international law, and federal common
law. Moreover, the Article only discusses statutory or treaty based foreign affairs issues to
the extent they relate to constitutional separation of powers controversies.
I.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE

This Part examines the evolution judicial doctrines of abstention and deference in
foreign affairs. Section A begins by briefly examining the judicial approach to foreign
affairs controversies in the early Republic. Section B reviews the current status of judicial
abstention in foreign affairs. Section C suggests that the court’s current jurisprudence of
political questions is gradually veering towards an institutional competence approach.
Finally, the last section lays out a critique of the current explanations the courts offer for
abstention on foreign affairs matters under the political question doctrine.
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Foreign Affairs Abstention and Deference in the Early Republic

One of the most familiar principles of American constitutional theory is that it is
the province of the courts, in Justice Marshall’s parlance, “to say what the law is.”9
Nonetheless, ever since Marshall’s declaration, the Supreme Court has consistently gone
out of its way to stress that under the political question doctrine, certain constitutional
controversies are not amenable to judicial review.10 Indeed, the very decision that
established judicial review also suggested that there were also certain exceptions to the
scope of such review. According to Marshall, these involved certain legal issues, which
were “in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to
the executive.”11 But while Marbury is frequently invoked for the proposition that it is the
province of the courts to interpret the law, this other part of the Marbury legacy is
frequently ignored. 12
Marshall pointed specifically to foreign affairs as one of the areas in which courts
should abstain from questioning the judgment of the executive branch. He observed that
the foreign affairs acts of an executive “officer . . . can never be examinable by the
courts.”13 The notion that Marshall expresses here – that foreign affairs is uniquely an
executive function that warrants special deference from the courts – antedates the
establishment of the Constitution. As early as 1765, William Blackstone affirmed the
supremacy of executive power in foreign affairs when he declared that “[w]hat is done by
the royal authority, with regard to foreign powers, is the act of the whole nation: what is
done without the king’s concurrence is the act only of private men.”14 The early English
cases also established a clear distinction between judicial and political authority in the
context of foreign affairs.15 The first reference to such a possible distinction by the
Supreme Court of the United States was in Ware v. Hylton,16 where Justice Iredell held
9

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803)
See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, (holding that whether the Senate could impeach federal judge
without giving him a full evidentiary hearing before the entire United States Senate constituted a political
question); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 452-454 (1939) (holding that the lifespan of proposed
constitutional amendment presented a non-justiciable political question).
11
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165-66.
12
See Susan Herman, Splitting the Atom of Marshall’s Wisdom, 16 ST JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT
371, 374-75 (2002) (contending that the current Supreme Court has forgotten the part of Marshall’s legacy
that emphasized Congress’s role in deciding the meaning of the Constitution).
13
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166.
14
W. BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES 252 (W. Morrison ed., Cavendish Publishing 2001).
15
See, e.g., Nabob of the Carnatic v. The East India Company, 2 Ves. Jr. 56 (1793) (the court
decided that matters regarding political treaties between a foreign state and the subjects of Great Britain
could not be examined by the judiciary); Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444 (1750) (holding that
conflicting boundary claims between Lord Baltimore and Penn were not justiciable). Both of these English
cases were cited approvingly by subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions in support of the proposition that
there is a political question doctrine. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 56 (1849); State of Ga.
v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50, 71 n.20 (1867).
16
3 U.S. (Dall.) 199 (1796).
10
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that the issue of whether there was a breach of a treaty between England and United
States involved “considerations of policy ... certainly entirely incompetent to the
examination and decision of a Court of Justice.”17
Despite these broad proclamations, however, the early Court decisions regarding
the scope of the political question doctrine were largely inconclusive.18 The Court did not
attempt to set forth a coherent framework for segregating political from legal questions
until the modern era.
B.

The Status of the Doctrine in the Modern Era

The Supreme Court’s most comprehensive effort to rationalize the political
question doctrine was Baker v. Carr, in which the Court held that the doctrine did not
apply to an equal protection challenge to the apportionment of legislative districts.19
Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in the case, surveyed the much of
preceding case law on political questions and came up with a laundry list of factors that
courts should consider in deciding whether to abstain under the doctrine. His oftenquoted opinion described those factors in substantial detail:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.20
Since Baker, the Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine twice in foreign affairs
controversies. In one case, the Court applied the doctrine to a constitutional challenge to
the training regimen of a National Guard unit,21 while a plurality of the Court invoked
17

Id. at 260
The first clear instance of the application of the doctrine by the Supreme Court was in Luther v.
Borden, which involved a challenge to the legality of the charter government of Rhode Island at the time of
the Dorr rebellion. 28 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). The Court treated this issue as a non-justiciable political
question because it held only Congress could enforce the provision of the Constitution that gave states the
right to a republican form of government. Id. at 47. In reaching this decision, the Court also considered the
practical difficulties that would result if it were to decide that the charter government of Rhodes Island was
illegal. Id. at 39-41. The Court provided little guidance, however, as to the kind of factors a court should
consider in deciding whether to invoke the doctrine.
19
362 U.S. 186 (1962).
20
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
21
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
18
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the doctrine in another case challenging the President’s authority to terminate a treaty
without Senate ratification.22 The political question doctrine is more active in the lower
courts where it has been recently applied to a wider range of foreign affairs disputes, such
as controversies over the allocation of foreign affairs powers,23 the issue of the liability of
successor states when a foreign state disintegrates,24 the question of whether a party can
recover for claims of forced labor in German camps,25 and the enforcement of a house
resolution approving of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.26
In invoking the doctrine in foreign affairs and other kinds of controversies, the
courts have sometimes relied on classical considerations, which assume that the
Constitution itself requires judicial abstention on the relevant constitutional
controversy.27 Professor Weschler, to whom we owe much of our modern understanding
of the classical version of the doctrine, made it clear that the scope of the doctrine was
narrow: “the only proper judgment that may lead to abstention from decision is that the
Constitution has committed the determination to another agency of government than the
courts.”28 Baker’s first factor, whether the issue involves “a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of an issue to a coordinate political department” mirrors
Weschler’s notion of a constitutionally based doctrine of the political question. 29
In response to Weschler’s classical model, Alexander Bickel argued that the
doctrine was not constitutionally mandated, but “something greatly more flexible,
something of prudence, not construction and not principle.”30 Baker’s five other factors fit
22

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
See e.g., Mahorner v. Bush, 224 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2002) (dismissing sua sponte as
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine a claim seeking to enjoin the President from engaging in
war against Iraq absent a declaration of war by Congress); Made in the USA Foundation v. United States,
242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that the issue of “what kinds of agreements require Senate
ratification...presents a nonjusticiable political question”).
24
See 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d
152, 164 (2d Cir. 2000); Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160 (2d Cir.1994).
25
See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.Supp.2d 424, 483-84 (D.N.J.1999).
26
See Greenberg v. Bush, 150 F.Supp.2d 447, 452-53 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
27
See, e.g., 767 Third Av. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160 (“Because the "nonjusticiability of political
questions is primarily a function of the constitutional separation of powers ... the dominant consideration in
any political question inquiry is whether there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department.") (quotations omitted)
28
Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8
(1959).
29
See Daniel Lovejoy, The Ambiguous Basis for Chevron Deference: Multiple Agency Statutes, 88 VA.
L. REV. 879, 891 (2002) (arguing that “all of the criteria that the Court described (except the first,
involving a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department”) reflect prudential concerns, rather than constitutional ones.”)
30
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term--Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 40, 46 (1961). Professor Scahrpf described a third non-constitutional version of the doctrine, which
he claimed was descriptively superior to Bickel’s prudential factors. See, Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review
and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 538-39, 566-83 (1966). In reality, the new
23
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Bickel’s prudential strain model, although many of the factors Baker are framed in terms
of institutional competence, as opposed to Bickel’s concerns of expediency.31
Bickel regarded the doctrine and the other judicial avoidance techniques as
critical in conserving the credibility of the judiciary and promoting principled decisionmaking. He claimed that by abstaining, “the Court does not necessarily forsake an
educational function, nor does it abandon principle.”32 In other words, by withholding
constitutional judgment in certain controversial cases, the Court could avoid engaging in
unprincipled decision-making by legitimating bad laws enacted by the political branches.33
C.

Blending the Two Strains of the Doctrine: A Shift Towards an Institutional Competence
Approach?

For the most part, the received wisdom has treated the constitutional and
prudential strains as analytically distinct, each vindicating different goals and possibly in
tension with each other.34 Indeed, Bickel himself strongly resisted the notion that the
political question doctrine, as he understood it, could have any constitutional
underpinnings: “[O]nly by means of a play on word can the broad discretion that the
courts have in fact exercised be turned into an act of constitutional interpretation
governed by the general standards of the interpretive process. The political question
doctrine simply resists being domesticated in this fashion.”35 From the perspective of the
factors that Scharpf describes -- difficulties of access to information, the need for uniformity of decisions,
and deference to wider responsibilities of the political departments – are all simply a different variation of
the prudential considerations described by Bickel. See Redish, supra note __, at 1043 (“[T]he ‘functional’
approach, as Scharpf describes it, appears to be merely a subset of a ‘prudential’ doctrine”).
31
Bickel described in broad language the circumstances that would justify invocation of the
doctrine:
[T]he Court’s sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness of the
issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it, which tends to
unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that
perhaps it should but will not be; (d) finally ("in a mature democracy"), the inner vulnerability, the selfdoubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (1962).
32
See BICKEL, supra note __, at 70. .
33
See Redish, supra note __, at 1031-32 (stating that Bickel viewed the doctrine as the “best means
to assure that the Supreme Court’s substantive constitutional decisions will be the outgrowth of logic and
reason, rather than of a purely pragmatic result orientation”).
34
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note __ at 263 (observing that “the problem with the prudential theory . .
. is that once the political question doctrine is unleashed entirely from the Constitution itself, what keeps a
judge use of the doctrine in check?”); Redish, supra note __ at 1049 (“[T]he concerns for principled
decisionmaking as a rationale for the political question doctrine represents an unduly narrow, short-sighted
and even solipsistic view of the judiciary’s function in a constitutional system”); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle
Vices of the “Passive Virtues”--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 1 (1964) (criticizing Bickel’s model as "vulnerable and dangerous"); Herbert Wechsler, Book Review, 75
YALE L.J. 672, 674 (1966) (arguing that Bickel’s model would “divorce the Court entirely from the text that
it interprets and ... equate completely what is constitutional and what is good.”).
35
BICKEL, supra note __ at 125.
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proponents of the constitutional strain of the doctrine, the implications of Bickel’s
prudential version were deeply troubling. As Gerald Gunther, one of Bickel’s most
outspoken critics noted: “Ultimately, it is Bickel’s starting point – his rigorous insistence
that constitutional adjudication be truly principled . . . that proved to be his undoing.”36
Framed in this manner, it would appear that the goals of the two strains of the
doctrine are irreconcilable. More importantly, in an era where the courts appear to
assume an exclusive role in policing constitutional activity between the political
branches,37 it would seem that Bickel’s non-legalistic conception of the judicial function,
especially its emphasis on discretionary abstention on constitutional questions, would be
problematic, if not heretical. Indeed, perhaps because of this difficulty, much of the
scholarly commentary now assumes that the Supreme Court has effectively abandoned
the prudential strain of the doctrine.38
Far from treating the two strains of the doctrine as distinct, however, the Court
often uses prudential considerations, more specifically institutional competence
considerations, to inform its textual analysis when deciding whether the Constitution
requires abstention on any specific issue.
Consider, for instance, the Court’s decision in Nixon v. United States, a case
involving whether the Senate could impeach a federal judge based on the report of a
Senate Committee rather than the Senate meeting as a whole.39 In that case, the Court
explicitly endorsed the blending of the two strains of the political question doctrine:
“[T]he concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political department is not
completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the
conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”40
Finally, in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society,41 the Court concluded that

36

Gunther, supra note __ at 24.
See also Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems
with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 138 (2000) (“Over the past three decades, the Court’s
interventions into structural constitutional review have established it as the undisputed ‘referee’ for
constitutional disputes between the political branches and disputes between the federal government and
the states.”).
38
See Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1230-31 (2002) (arguing that silences
in Bush v. Gore suggests the end of the political question doctrine as a counsel of prudence).
39
506 U.S. 224 (1993)
40
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228-29; see also 767 Third Ave. Associates v. Consulate General of Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Although prudential considerations may
inform a court's justiciability analysis, the political question doctrine is essentially a constitutional limitation
on the courts.”).
41
478 U.S. 221 (1986).
37
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the interpretation of treaties did not present a political question, but noted the continued
relevance of institutional competence factors in making that determination.42
In both Nixon and Japan Whaling Association, the Court applied an institutional
competence gloss to its decisions to abstain from an issue on constitutional grounds. As
the next part of this Article demonstrates, however, the Court has yet to articulate a
coherent set of institutional competence factors to guide its analysis as to when to invoke
the political question doctrine in foreign affairs.
D.

The Shortcomings in the Court’s Formal Criteria for Abstention in Foreign Affairs

In the modern era, the courts have justified abstention from foreign affairs on the
basis of a mixture of rationales derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v.
Carr, ranging from the “textual commitment of [an activity] to the coordinate branches”
to a variety of prudential considerations.43 Occasionally, the courts have invoked other
considerations, such as the concern that that the stakes may be too high,44 the difficulty
of access to foreign evidence,45 and the extreme sensitivity of foreign affairs.46 None of
these factors have proven, however, to be satisfactory. The “textual commitment” prong
paints a false picture of the doctrine because the constitutional text does not delegate
interpretive authority to any specific branch. On the other hand, Baker’s prudential
factors paint too broad a picture because they do not distinguish which foreign affairs
controversies merit abstention under the doctrine, or even why such controversies should
be treated any differently from domestic disputes. More specifically, the courts’ decisions
routinely refer to certain decisions as inappropriate for the judiciary, but they do not
explain in any systematic fashion why such decisions, and not others, present such unique
challenges to judicial resolution.
1. The Textual Commitment Prong of the Doctrine
To inquire, as Baker requires, as to whether specific textual provisions
commit the resolution of a constitutional issue to a political branch is to assume that such
demonstrable textual commitments exist. While this assumption seems reasonable at an
abstract level, it becomes less clear when the courts face actual controversies. This is
because the constitutional text says little, if anything, about the actual issue of
42

Id. at 230 (observing that “[t]he Judiciary is particularly ill suited to make [policy choices and
value determinations], as ‘courts are fundamentally underequipped to formulate national policies or develop
standards for matters not legal in nature.").
43
See, e.g., Schroder v. Bush, 263 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 2001); Made in the USA Found. v.
United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1312-16 (11th Cir. 2001).
44
See Franck, supra note __ at 50-58 (describing and criticizing application of “high stakes” prong
of doctrine).
45
See also id at 46-48.
46
See Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana v. Dep’t of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 347 (7th Cir.
2001)
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constitutional interpretation.47 More importantly, since the entire panoply of all
congressional and presidential powers stem from the Constitution, why would certain
grants of powers, but not others, be amenable to judicial review?
The textual commitment prong seems most difficult to justify in the context when
there is a constitutional challenge to a decision of the political branches. One classic
example is when the courts decline to review disputes regarding the allocation of foreign
affairs powers.
a.

Allocation of Foreign Affairs Powers

Some constraints on political branch authority in foreign affairs are
constitutionally based. But discerning which branches have the authority to interpret the
scope of these constitutional constraints, especially in the foreign affairs context, is far
from clear. With certain exceptions,48 the courts have taken the lead in deciding on the
merits those foreign affairs controversies that implicate individual rights,49 or those that
affect federal-state relations.50 With respect to the division of foreign affairs authority
between the President and the Congress, however, the courts have played a minimal, if
not a non-existent, role. Indeed, except when such controversies directly implicate
individual rights or property interests,51 the courts have consistently invoked the political
question doctrine when asked to adjudicate on separation of powers controversies
involving foreign affairs.52
47

See Barkow, supra note __ at 253 (observing that “[t]he Constitution does not contain an
express textual commitment of judicial review in the Supreme Court” and thus “it is not surprising that
provisions of the Constitution do not explicitly strip the Court of power and vest interpretive authority with
Congress or the Executive.”).
48
See, e.g., Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1975) (declining to review on political
question grounds taxpayer challenge to constitutionality of United States military aid to Israel, even though
taxpayer was claiming such aid was violative of the First Amendment’s establishment clause).
49
See infra text accompanying notes __
50
The courts’ treatment of state laws that implicate foreign affairs is subsumed under a doctrinal
framework called “dormant foreign affairs preemption.” Under this doctrine, the courts will invalidate a
decision of a state if it gets too involved in foreign affairs. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)
(holding that an Oregon state law that disallowed aliens from communist countries from inheriting property
was an “intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the
President and Congress.”). For a critical analysis of this doctrine and an argument that states should have a
greater role in foreign affairs, see Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1617, 1659-60 (1997).
51
In the Steel Seizure case, for instance, the Court did reject as unconstitutional the President’s
decision to nationalize the steel industries without congressional authorization, but the decision focused
very much on the fact that the seizure violated individual property rights. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952); see also Ruth Wedgwood, The Uncertain Career of Executive Power,
25 YALE J. INT’L L 310, 313 (2000) (“The real lesson of the Steel Seizure Case, is . . . that citizens are offlimits. The Constitutionally protected entitlements of citizens, in liberty and property, may sharply limit the
domain of presidential foreign affairs powers”).
52
See Goldwater, 444 U.S,. at 998; Made in USA Foundation, 242 F.3d at 1312; Mahorner, 224
F.Supp. 2d at 48.
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But in an era where intrusion by the courts into separation of powers controversies
in domestic affairs is on the rise,53 it remains a mystery as to why the courts consistently
abstain from similar controversies in the foreign affairs context. Why should a separation
of powers controversy over the line-item veto such as the one decided in Clinton v. New
York,54 for instance, be treated any differently than a controversy regarding the authority
of the President to enter international agreements without the Senate’s consent?55 It does
not help matters much to state simply that foreign affairs matters are distinguishable
because, as noted in Baker v. Carr,56 such matters are committed to the political branches.
The larger question here is not whether a particular foreign policy function is committed
to a particular political branch, but which branch has the ultimate responsibility to make
that determination? In his dissent in Goldwater v Carter, Justice Brennan, who wrote the
majority opinion in Baker v. Carr, insisted that such power properly belonged to the
courts: “[T]he [political question] doctrine does not pertain when a court is faced with
the antecedent question whether a particular branch has been constitutionally designated
as the repository of political decisionmaking power.” 57 Much of the subsequent academic
commentary on this issue has embraced Justice Brennan’s view.58
In any event, Justice Brennan’s reservations on the scope of the doctrine
notwithstanding, the question remains as to whether there is any plausible constitutional
basis that would justify judicial abstention on interpretive issues in foreign affairs.
Significantly, there is no single textual provision that explicitly supports a delegation of
interpretive authority in foreign affairs to the political branches. Outside the treaty and
war-making provisions, most commentators agree that there are relatively few
constitutional provisions that deal explicitly with the allocation of foreign affairs powers.59
In the absence of any explicit textual support for the interpretive variant of the
political question doctrine, some courts and commentators have relied on historical
53

See also Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems
with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 138 (2000) (“Over the past three decades, the Court’s
interventions into structural constitutional review have established it as the undisputed ‘referee’ for
constitutional disputes between the political branches and disputes between the federal government and
the states.”).
54
524 U.S. 417, 446 (1998).
55
See Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
56
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (observing that in addition to being textually committed to the
political branches, the “resolution of [foreign affairs] issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial
application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature;
but many such questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Governments views.”)
57
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1006-07 (1979).
58
See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note __ at 37-38; Glennon, supra note __ at 815.
59
See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111
YALE L. J. 231, 236-37 (2001) (“A common tenet of scholars who agree on little else is that once one moves
beyond the war and treaty-making powers, the Constitution itself has little to say about the relative roles of
the President and Congress, but rather contain substantial gaps that compel resort to other
considerations”).
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practice and structural considerations.60 But the early constitutional history regarding the
scope and application of the doctrine is inconclusive. Although Justice Marshall did
occasionally state that the political branches were entrusted with the conduct of foreign
affairs to the exclusion of the judiciary,61 he also seemed to suggest that nothing should
stand in the way of an independent judicial determination as to whether a political
branch had constitutionally overstepped its foreign affairs powers.62 Indeed, the latter
view has been occasionally supported in dicta by some courts in the modern era.63 In any
event, it was not almost until the civil war that courts started to defer to or abstain from
controversies involving the constitutional allocation of foreign affairs authority.64
Efforts to use structural inferences to justify the interpretive prong of the political
question doctrine fare no better. The commentators who support this approach argue that
while constitutional limits regarding individual rights should be entrusted to the courts,
the resolution of separation of powers disputes ought to be left to the political branches.65
According to these commentators, this division of authority can be inferred from the fact
60

See, e.g., Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1312 n.27 (11th
Cir.2001) (“[W]e believe that history may inform the inquiry inasmuch as it fleshes out the manner in
which the executive and legislative branches have sought to exercise and accommodate their textually
committed foreign affairs powers over time”); Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential
Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 157 (1995) (“[S]ince the argument for the power of judicial review is
itself a brilliant structural inference supported by historical understanding, the argument for each and every
political question exception to Marbury-style review must likewise be largely one of structural inference
supported by history and tradition.”); see also Barkow, supra note __ at 320-21 (discussing structural bases
for deference to the political branches).
61
See supra text accompanying notes __
62
In some of the other early constitutional controversies in the Court over the allocation of foreign
affairs authority, for instance, Marshall proceeded to reach the decisions on the merits and delimit the
relevant political branch’s authority on foreign affairs. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
110, 112(1814) (declaring invalid an executive seizure of British property without congressional
authorization during the war of 1812); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (holding that a
commander of a ship who, on express instructions from the President, seized a vessel sailing from a French
part was liable in damages to any person injured by the seizure, where such seizure was not authorized by
Congress).
63
See, e.g., Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1147-48 (D.D.C. 1990) (opining that the question
as to whether the President could commence hostilities in Iraq without a congressional declaration of war
did not implicate the political question doctrine, but ultimately dismissing the claim on other justiciability
grounds); but see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 25 (2000) (holding that decision in Dellums was mere
dicta).
64
See HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 84 (observing that by the mideighteenth century, “courts made fewer forays into the area [of foreign affairs] and their ruling grew
increasingly deferential to executive prerogative.”); see also Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4,186) (finding that the President had discretion to act to protect lives and
property of citizens).
65
See Barkow, supra note __ at 325 (“[The] structure [of the Constitution] dictates that some
questions properly belong to the judiciary. Most fundamentally, the judiciary, because of its independence,
is best suited to protect individual liberties from oppression by the majority”); Mulhern, supra note __ at
164 (proposing a model that distinguishes political questions and those appropriate for judicial review based
upon whether the issue involves the protection of individual ri ghts).
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that the courts are uniquely positioned to safeguard individual rights because of their
independence, and the political branches are better positioned to safeguard separation of
powers issues because of their political accountability.66
In the abstract, the proposition that the judiciary should focus its resources on
protecting individual rights, rather than separation of powers or federalism concerns,
seems fairly uncontroversial. Indeed, this notion fits quite nicely with Chief Justice
Marshall’s loose description of political questions as those “respect[ing] the nation, not
individual rights.”67 In practice, however, the line dividing political questions from those
subject to judicial review does not lend itself to such an easy fit.
To understand the difficulties inherent in such a dichotomy of the judicial
function, it is worthwhile to revisit the thesis of Jesse Choper, who years ago also argued
that the courts should abstain from deciding constitutional questions concerning the
separation of powers.68 Choper focused on functional considerations, observing that the
courts possessed limited political capital,69 and that the political branches were capable of
protecting their own constitutional interests.70 Choper’s response to the courts’ relative
lack of political capital was to carve out all constitutional controversies not involving
individual rights from judicial review, but he acknowledged that his theory did not meet
the formal criteria for non-justiciability under the political question doctrine.71
In the end, Choper’s efforts to re-conceptualize the role of the federal judiciary
proved untenable. As some of Choper’s critics observed, two of the key assumptions
underlying his theory seemed particularly problematic: (1) that the political branches
were capable of reaching the right balance in separations of powers controversies,72 and
66

See Barkow, supra note __ at 325-26; Muhern, supra note __ at 164-65.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
68
See JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITCIAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 379 (1980). Building on political safeguards of
federalism arguments first advanced by Professor Herbert Wechsler about fifty years ago, Choper also
argued that “the federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions respecting the ultimate power
of the national government vis-a-vis the states; rather, the constitutional issue of whether federal action is
beyond the authority of the central government and thus violates ‘states’ rights’ should be nonjusticiable.”
Id. at 175; see also Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). The Choper-Weschler
political safeguards of federalism argument was initically adopted by the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), but was subsequently rejected by United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311,
1312 (1997) (arguing that Garcia is no longer the controlling theory concerning judicial review of
federalism questions).
69
See CHOPER, supra note __ at 129-37.
70
Id. at 379.
71
Id.
72
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 492 n. 230 (1991) (“[N]either of
Choper's fundamental assumptions comports with political and constitutional reality”); see also Id. at 492
67
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(2) that the judiciary’s political capital was transferable to the political branches.73
Eventually, it was only a matter of time before the Supreme Court rejected the normative
underpinnings of Choper’s approach.74 In handling separation of powers controversies, the
courts have instead alternated between a formalistic approach, which takes a strict
approach to separation of powers issues,75 and a functional approach, which focuses on
whether the underlying arrangement disturbs the overall balance of power among the
different political branches.76
Although courts are increasingly reluctant to abstain on separation of powers
issues in the domestic sphere, one could argue that Choper’s functional concerns may still
have special relevance in the foreign affairs context. Professor Yoo seems to have adopted
such an approach in his analysis of the judicial role in the allocation of war powers. To
summarize, Yoo has argued that courts should abstain from reviewing such questions,
“because the Framers intended to establish a self-regulating system wherein the executive
and legislative branches would monitor and control each other.”77 Yoo attaches much
importance to the fact that Congress can control the executive’s war related activities
through the power of the purse.78 But both the courts and commentators have strongly
disputed the notion that Congress’s power over the purse sufficiently safeguards its
constitutional prerogative in foreign affairs.79 Even if one accepts the normative thrust of
(“If no tendency toward equilibrium can be established, Choper's faith that separation of powers is selfenforcing seems highly questionable”).
73
See id. at 492
74
See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990) (“This Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty”); Steven G. Calabresi, The
Structural Constitution and the Counter-majoritarian Difficulty, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 3, 4 (1998)
(observing that “during the last 25 years--from the Nixon era to the Clinton era--the Supreme Court has
come to play a very active non-Choperian role in separation of powers issues, in contrast to the more
passive role it played between 1937 and 1974”).
75
See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, __ (1998) (holding that line-item veto violated the
separation of powers); Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-51 (1983)
(holding that the legislative veto violated the separation of powers).
76
See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-96 (1988) ("[T]he real question is whether the
removal restrictions [as applied to the independent counsel] are of such a nature that they impede the
President's ability to perform his constitutional duty”); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-54 (1982)
("[A] court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be
served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.”). For a
detailed analysis of the difference between the functionalist and formalist approach, see M. Elizabeth Magill,
The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1136-47 (2000).
77
John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by other Means: The Original Understanding or War Powers,
84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 300 (1996); see also Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D.D.C. 1990) (“Congress
possesses ample powers under the Constitution to prevent Presidential over-reaching, should Congress
choose to exercise them.”).
78
Id. at 295.
79
See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C.Cir.1973) (observing that that "[t]his court
cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy knows: that in voting to appropriate money or to draft men a
Congressman is not necessarily approving of the continuation of a war no matter how specifically the
appropriation or draft act refers to that war”); see also David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign
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Yoo’s argument, however, it is still not clear why such self-enforcing safeguards would
only be relevant in the foreign affairs context.80 As one other commentator has observed,
in the past couple of years there has been “an astonishing revival of judicial, and
especially Supreme Court, enforcement of the structural constitution.”81 Why this revival
has escaped the foreign affairs realm cannot be simply explained on the basis of “selfregulating” constitutional norms, however, since such norms would presumably apply to
domestic affairs disputes.
In sum, whatever the normative merits of Choper’s claim, it is indisputable that it
fails to give a correct descriptive account of the political question doctrine as currently
practiced by the courts. And while it may be true that courts in the modern era have
abstained from separation of powers controversies involving foreign affairs, neither
Choper’s functional approach, nor the structural arguments described above, provides a
coherent theory of why the political question doctrine should apply to such cases, but not
others.
b.

Other Adjudicative Applications

Even if we exclude allocation of powers disputes from the analysis, the textual
commitment prong still fails to provide a coherent explanation for many instances in
which the courts invoke the political question doctrine in foreign affairs. Indeed, the most
common application of the political question doctrine in foreign affairs involves
adjudicative type issues that occur when a political branch is acting within its
constitutionally designated role.82 Subsumed under this category are all those issues that
do not involve disputes about which branch has the authority to engage in constitutional
interpretation, but nonetheless seem to involve a strong adjudicative element, such as the
resolution of disputed factual claims. 83
Affairs, in DAVID GRAY ADLER AND LARRY N. GEORGE, EDS., THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19, 32-35 (U. Press of Kansas, 1996) (“[N]o matter how formidable the
weapons [of Congress] may appear to be, they are difficult to effectuate”); Koh, The National Security
Constitution, supra note at 133 (“Some legislative restraints are rarely applied simply because they leave
members vulnerable to political criticism. Appropriations cutoffs, for example, expose legislators to charges
of having stranded soldiers in the field”); Redish, “If Angels were to Govern”, supra note __ at 492 (“But
th[e] assumption [that congressional silence signals Congress’s approval of executive action is unwarranted]
because institutional barriers may prevent Congress from acting despite its disapproval of the President’s
action.”)
80
See Ku, supra note __ at 139 (observing that “[t]here is reason to doubt that the Supreme Court
is willing to leave questions of constitutional structure to protection by the political process.”)
81
Calabresi, supra note __ at 3.
82
See, e.g., 767 Third Avenue Assocs., 218 F.3d at 164 (successor state liability when foreign state
disintegrates); Can v. United States, 14 F.3d at 164 (recognition and successor state liability).
83
According to some commentators, these kinds of disputes can be read as routine instances of
constitutional interpretation by the courts, and therefore not political questions. See, e.g., Henkin, supra
note __ at 610-611. Outside the foreign affairs context, however, the courts regularly resolve disputes of
fact or other non-interpretive issues even when the dispute or the non-interpretive issue affects a
constitutional allocation of authority to a political branch. Thus, the key question is why the courts
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One pertinent example of the application of the question that does not involve
allocation of foreign affairs powers between Congress and the President is the recognition
of foreign governments.84 Although the constitutional text does not explicitly address the
President’s power to recognize foreign governments, courts have routinely held that such
authority is implicit in the President’s Article II power to appoint and receive
Ambassadors.85 Thus, in principle, the President’s authority to recognize foreign
governments would seem to exclude any judicial role, and numerous decisions have held
as much.86 In practice, however, certain courts have used various guises to try to contain
the effect of presidential recognition or non-recognition of foreign governments,
especially when such presidential acts distinguish between de facto and de jure
governments.87

routinely abstain on such non-interpretive issues in the foreign affairs context, but do not do so in the
domestic context. For instance, why would a court decline to review the enforcement policies of a federal
agency just because it affected foreign affairs, as it did in Wood v. Verity, 729 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Fla.
1989), where such abstention is unheard of in the domestic context? The answer cannot simply be that it is
because the Constitution allocates foreign affairs powers to the political branches. The same Constitution
also allocates much of the national domestic policy making to the political branches, yet the courts do not
hesitate to review those kinds of questions. See Spiro, supra note __ at 677 (observing that “outside of the
foreign relations context, those constitutional provisions that seem most amenable to interpretation have
not been insulated from judicial considerations”).
84
Other examples in this category include issues such as: the legal authority of the representative
of foreign nations to negotiate treaties, see Doe v. Braden, 16 How. (U.S.) 635 (1853); the resolution of
disputes arising over conflicting claims to territory, see Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet. ) 415,
420 (1839); the determination of the rightful government of a foreign state, see Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) at 420; the resolution of disputed state successorship issues, see Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 165
(2d Cir. 1994); and tort suits for damages for United States mining of foreign harbors, see Chaser Shipping
Corp. v. United States, 649 F. Supp, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
85
See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1936) (Executive had sole authority to
recognize and negotiate with Soviet government); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 319 (1936) (the President is the “sole organ of the nation in its external relations”); The Maret, 145
F.2d 431, 442 (3d Cir. 1944) (nonrecognition of foreign sovereign is essential power conferred upon
President by Constitution); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
204, comment a (1986) (observing that such authority “is implied in the President's express constitutional
power to appoint Ambassadors (article II, section 2) and to receive Ambassadors (article II, section 3), and
his implied power to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.”).
86
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (“Who is the sovereign, de jure or de
facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative
and executive branch of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as other officers, citizens and
subjects of the government”); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938) (“What
government is to be regarded as representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political rather than a judicial
question, and it is to be determined by the political branch of the government”).
87
According to Black’s law dictionary, a de facto government is “one that maintains itself by a
display of force against the will of the rightful legal government and is successful, at least temporarily, in
overturning the institutions of the rightful government by setting up its own in lieu thereof.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 416 (6th Ed. 1990). On the other hand, a de jure government refers to “a condition in which
there has been total compliance with all requirements of law.” Id. at 425.
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One particular technique that certain courts have employed in such cases is to
differentiate between the juridical act of recognition by the President and the domestic
legal effects of such recognition. For instance, in Upright v. Mercury Business Machines
Co.,88 a New York state court adopted a de facto analysis in deciding for itself whether to
recognize the effects of transactions within East Germany, even though the executive had
expressly declined to recognize the East German government at the time. “A foreign
government,” the court ruled, “although not recognized by the political arm of the United
States Government, may nevertheless have de facto existence which is juridically
cognizable. The acts of such a de facto government may affect private rights and
obligations arising either as a result of activity in, or with corporations within, the
territory controlled by such a de facto government.”89 By giving legal effect to the actions
of the unrecognized East German government, the Upright court essentially substituted its
own judgment in place of that of the executive branch as to what the legal effects of nonrecognition should be.
But if the Constitution grants the President the authority to recognize foreign
governments, on what basis may a court assert for itself the power to determine the legal
implications of such recognition, especially when such determinations may be contrary to
presidential policy? In response, some commentators have argued that the legal effects of
the President’s recognition powers are constrained by the norms of international law, and
thus the courts should not abstain from addressing these issues under the political
question doctrine.90 According to these commentators, since under international law
there is no difference between a de facto and a de jure government, recognition should be
conferred once a foreign government assumes effective control over the government
machinery.91 In the American experience, however, the executive branch does not always
adhere to the legal criteria suggested by international law, but instead often uses

88

213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (N.Y. App.Div. 1961). Prior to Upright, the New York Court of Appeals gave
effect to the nationalization decrees of the Soviet Union, which at the time was not recognized by the
Soviet Union. See Salimoff & Co v. Standard Oil of N.Y., 262 N.Y. 220 (N.Y. 1933); but see Autocephalous
Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 292-93 (7th Cir.
1990) (deferring to the executive branch’s non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and
suggesting that that the Salimoff and Upright cases were decided wrongly).
89
Upright, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
90
See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts, 26 AM. J.
INT’L L. 261, 261 (1932); see also Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign
Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1153-54 (1985) (“The foreign policy area, however, is not
wholly within the absolute discretion of the political branches. One function of law is precisely to set
boundaries to the political process and to proscribe conduct that is not the legitimate subject of the process.
Fundamental norms of international law provide such boundaries.”).
91
SEE HERSH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (1947); Borchard, supra
note __ at 261 (“When a government has been successfully established in a country, regardless of the means
and regardless of the form of that government, international law presumes that it will be, and must be,
accepted as the agent of the state”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 203, comment b (observing that “there is a duty to treat as the government a regime that
is the government in fact, just as there is an obligation to treat as a state an entity that is a state in fact”).
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recognition as a policy tool to signal favoritism or displeasure towards particular regimes.92
In such circumstances, these commentators argue, the courts should accord very little
weight to the executive branch’s determinations when deciding the legal effects of
recognition.93
There is no need for me to address the relative merits of these various positions.
What is relevant here is that the criteria for recognition espoused by these commentators
and the Restatement seems to be of a kind that is particularly susceptible to judicial
resolution. Indeed, once a “political” function touches on questions that are essentially
adjudicative in nature, categorical assertions that the courts have no role to play in
resolving such questions become more difficult to justify. This is especially true when
these questions come up in the context of controversies over which a court has proper
jurisdiction, such as tort, contract, or property disputes. In such circumstances, textual
inferences about the separations of powers seem weak because one cannot claim that the
courts, by adjudicating on the merits of routine legal disputes, are usurping the kind of
policy function that normally belongs to the political branches.
Cases like Upright demonstrate a tension between the political branches’ power to
conduct foreign affairs and the power of the courts to make certain factual or legal
determinations in the course of resolving disputes under their jurisdiction.94 After all,
both powers appear to be constitutionally based, and the textual language often provides
no clear guidance as to why one form of authority should trump the other.
In sum, the courts continue to justify their political question decisions in
constitutional terms, often invoking the textual commitment of powers to the political
branches. What is lacking, however, is a clear or coherent interpretive theory of
constitutional delegation that would account for the courts’ actual practice in political
question cases, especially those implicating foreign affairs. As demonstrated above,
attempts to couch the question in purely textual, historical, or structural terms have
proven inadequate. It is not that these foregoing considerations are not relevant, but that
on their own they do not sufficiently explain the scope of the political question doctrine.
Not surprisingly, in addition to textual or structural considerations, the judiciary has often
92

See Note, Out from the Precarious Orbit of Politics: Reconsidering Recognition and the Standing of
Foreign Governments to Sue in U.S. Courts, 29 VA. J. INT’L L 473, 479 (1989) (observing that “although
rhetorically states have generally adhered to a duty to recognize established governments, in actuality they
have often used recognition as an instrument of policy”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203, Reporters Note 1 ( “United States practice long reflected the view that
recognition was not a matter of international obligation but could be granted or withheld at will, to further
national policy”).
93
See Borchard, supra note __ at 264 (“The necessities of administering justice in a court cannot
be made to depend upon whether the executive likes or dislikes one of the parties whose laws or acts require
application”).
94
In more recent times, a federal court has ruled that the President’s decision not to recognize a
foreign state does not necessarily prevent the unrecognized state from having access to U.S. courts. See
National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1988).

The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs

21

also relied on considerations of institutional competence and expediency in order to
bolster its theory that the constitution requires judicial abstention on separation of powers
controversies in foreign affairs.95 The next section turns to a critical analysis of these other
considerations, which the courts and commentators often refer to as comprising the
prudential prong of the political question doctrine.
2. The Prudential Prong of the Doctrine
Strictly speaking, the notion that there may be a prudential strain of the
political question doctrine that is wholly distinct from the constitutional strain no longer
reflects the current state of the doctrine. As Bickel originally envisioned it, courts would
only be entitled to abstain as a matter of prudence, which he assumed would involve caseby-case judgments about the political expediency of judicial intervention.96 In the modern
era, however, courts have usually invoked these so-called prudential factors not for
expediency reasons, but rather as institutional competence factors that inform the
constitutional strain of the doctrine.97 The courts have failed, however, to explain
adequately the substance and scope of these institutional competence factors. Indeed, in
most circumstances, when invoking the doctrine in foreign affairs cases, courts simply
recite the litany of Baker factors with hardly any analysis.98
The most widely cited prudential or institutional competence factor involves the
claim that the disputed issue “lacks judicially discoverable and manageable standards.”99
Critics of the political question doctrine have roundly dismissed this rationale as
indefensible and incoherent, observing that the sort of questions that the courts abstain
from under the political question doctrine are usually no less susceptible to judicial
standards than the other legal questions that the courts routinely address.100
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At first blush, one cannot quarrel with the argument that certain constitutional
issues, such as those regarding the proper allocation of war-making authority, may seem
just as amenable to judicial standards as controversies regarding the scope of the
fourteenth amendment equal protection provisions. Indeed, the patchwork of principles
and standards that the courts have come up with to guide their decisions on certain
domestic constitutional questions, such as due process requirements, suggests that the
courts are equal to the task of inventing standards or rules for even the vaguest legal
provisions.
On the other hand, however, one could argue that the difficulty in deriving
judicial standards in foreign affairs controversies is not necessarily because of the
complexity or vagueness of the underlying foreign affairs issues, but because the very
nature of most foreign affairs issues is inherently political.101 The problem with the
foregoing analysis is that it seems to conflate the purely discretionary or ministerial foreign
affairs powers of the political branches with those powers that implicate the political
question doctrine. Where the political branches are free to act without any legal or
constitutional constraints, the political question doctrine does not apply and the courts
can simply conclude that the political branches have acted within their constitutional
authority. Because the political question doctrine comes into play only when there seem
to be legal constraints on the authority of the political branches, however, the question
remains as to why courts would refuse to adjudicate when these constraints implicate
foreign affairs issues, but not in other circumstances. In the end, the “lack of judicially
discoverable standards” rationale does not seem on its own to justify the disparate judicial
treatment of foreign and domestic disputes.
Equally problematic is the tendency by courts to abstain from foreign affairs
controversies, including those involving separating of powers controversies, on the basis
that “such questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government’s
views.”102 The origin of this unitary view of the foreign affairs powers is probably Justice
Sutherland’s rumination in Curtis Wright that: “[I]n this vast external realm [of foreign
affairs] . . . , the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation.”103 Justice Sutherland’s opinion has been rightly criticized for trying to unmoor the
foreign affairs powers from the Constitution.104 But beyond the problems with Justice
101

See, e.g., Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196,
1198 (5 Cir. 1978). (holding that it could not resolve a claim that involved a disputed territorial dispute
“[b]ecause no law exists binding these sovereigns and allocating rights and liabilities, no method to
judicially resolve their disagreements.”).
102
Baker, 369 U.S. at 211; see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“In our dealings with the outside world, the United States speaks with one voice and acts as
one, umembarrassed by the complications as to domestic issues which are inherent in the distribution of
political power between the national government and the individual states.”).
103
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
104
See Koh, supra note __ at 94 n. 121 (collecting critical commentary); see also id. (“[T]he
significant point is that Curtiss-Wright painted a dramatically different vision of the National Security
Constitution from that which has prevailed since the founding of the Republic”).
th

The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs

23

Sutherland’s normative vision of the role of the executive branch in foreign affairs, there
is also the additional problem that his account does not describe correctly the dynamic
between the political branches in foreign affairs.
Far from taking a “single-voice” approach to foreign affairs matters, Congress and
the President routinely joust for power in foreign affairs matters. For instance, in the postVietnam war era, Congress took a range of significant measures to curb executive warmaking powers,105 ranging from the cutoff of funding for the air war in Cambodia,106 to the
termination of military aid to Turkey after it invaded Cyprus.107 All of these incidents
reflect instances where the political branches did not take a cooperative approach to
foreign relations issues, even when these issues implicated fairly sensitive national security
concerns. Thus, as a practical matter, the “single voiced” rationale reaches too far,
because it assumes a picture of our “foreign relations” constitution that simply does not
exist. As one commentator has observed, in those instances where the political branches
cannot come to agreement over a foreign affairs matter, “other nations are asked to
understand our complex constitutional system of checks and balances and somehow we
manage to survive as a nation.”108
Similarly, other rationales, such as those that claim foreign affairs issues are “high
stakes” are equally problematic. Far from skirting controversy, the courts often seem
perfectly willing to entertain domestic disputes that involve politically sensitive issues.109
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s willingness to engage the most politically contentious issues
can be surmised from its recent decisions in the 2000 presidential election disputes.110 In
those cases, the Court confronted a fairly sensitive question regarding the propriety of
procedures for selecting presidential electors under Article II of the Constitution, and it
appeared perfectly willing to wander into the political thicket. Because of the extreme
sensitivity of the issues involved in these cases, many commentators have argued that the
Court should have abstained from addressing those issues under the political question
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doctrine.111 In any event, the 2000 presidential election cases demonstrate that the courts
will not necessarily shy away from resolving legal disputes merely because they touch upon
politically controversial issues. Indeed, it is difficult to find any cases in the modern era,
including those implicating foreign affairs, where the courts have relied exclusively on
such a “high stakes” rationale as grounds for abstaining from a legal controversy.
The other rationales given to justify judicial abstention from foreign affairs issues –
the courts’ lack of access to the facts and the risk of embarrassing the political branches112
– have been sufficiently criticized elsewhere,113 and most of those critiques do not bear
worth repeating here. In any event, as Professor Redish makes clear, these factors do not
seem to distinguish adequately political questions from those other decisions that the
courts have found justiciable.114 To be sure, many of these factors may be relevant when
courts face controversies that pose a threat to their credibility, but the courts have at
their disposal better procedural devices for avoiding such confrontations with the political
branches.115 As Bickel has observed, these devices include a range of other constitutional
and prudential limits on the exercise of judicial power such as standing, ripeness, the case
and controversy requirement, and the discretionary power to deny certiorari.116
A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICS OF JUDICIAL ABSTENTION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

II.

Appreciating a vulnerable target when they see one, critics of the political
question doctrine have pointed to the inconsistencies in the courts’ existing approach as
evidence that the doctrine lacks any justification on constitutional or prudential
grounds.117 As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, however, these critics seem to have
done a better job in tearing down the rationales underlying the current approaches to the
doctrine than in building up a coherent case for broad judicial involvement in foreign
affairs. This Part will begin by evaluating the internationalist critique of judicial
111
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abstention in foreign affairs and its call for the complete abandonment of the political
question doctrine. It will then describe the response by the international relations school
of liberalism and its more narrow recommendation that the scope of the doctrine be
severely restricted in foreign affairs disputes, but not abandoned completely. This Part will
demonstrate that both of these approaches ignore certain fundamental institutional
problems that the courts face when they adjudicate on foreign affairs controversies.
A.

The Defects of the Internationalist Approach

The most pronounced critics of the political question doctrine in foreign affairs
tend to embrace an internationalist vision of the role of law in inter-state relations. To
these scholars, calls for judicial abstention in foreign affairs are simply calls for the
abdication of the rule of law on issues that affect international policy.118 In other words,
these scholars tend reject the any sharp dichotomy between the role of the rule of law on
domestic and international issues.119
A major proponent of the internationalist approach and one of the most
outspoken critics of judicial abstention in foreign affairs is Professor Thomas Franck.
Franck traces the origin of the tradition of judicial abstention in foreign affairs to Chief
Justice Marshall’s dictum in Marbury that the President’s actions in foreign affairs “can
never be examinable by the courts.”120 According to Franck, the view espoused by
Marshall and some of the other early cases relied erroneously on British precedent, which
Franck claims introduced into American foreign affairs law “a monarchical notion of
indivisible power over foreign affairs.”121 Franck rejects this British tradition as
inconsistent with the express constitutional division of foreign affairs powers between the
President and Congress.122
Although Franck’s analysis of the origins of the courts’ deference to foreign affairs
is illuminating, the implications he draws from it are problematic. Franck insists that the
solution to the chaotic treatment courts accord foreign affairs cases lies in the complete
abandonment of the political question doctrine.123 In its place, Franck would substitute a
rule where the courts would defer to the political branches’ findings of evidence in foreign
118
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affairs – a proposal that he models after the German approach. 124 According to Franck,
his proposal would remedy both the constitutional and policy defects inherent in the
courts’ usual practice of abstention in foreign affairs cases.125 In other words, Franck
believes that the rule of law is vindicated only when the courts have the power to
adjudicate on the merits of every constitutional dispute, including those implicating
foreign policy.126
Franck’s proposal faces many insuperable obstacles, not the least of which is that
he never attempts to explain the source of the judiciary’s purported monopoly over
constitutional interpretation or adjudicative matters generally. Nothing in the
Constitution addresses directly the allocation of interpretive powers amongst the various
branches. More importantly, not much in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v.
Madison, which first established the power of judicial review, suggests that the judiciary
ought to exercise the interpretive function to the exclusion of all the other branches.
Indeed, as Larry Kramer has recently demonstrated, Marbury v. Madison did not in any
way embrace the notion of judicial monopoly over constitutional interpretation. “The
achievement of judicial review in this early period . . . was a successful bid by judges to an
equal place in the scheme--to status as members of a coordinate branch, capable of
making and acting upon independent judgments about the meaning of the
Constitution. This, in fact, is all that Marbury v. Madison actually says or does.”127 Thus, if
the Constitution is understood as a framework that allocates some measure of interpretive
power to all the branches, the notion of judicial abstention or deference on certain
constitutional issues makes sense.
In the modern era, however, the notion that the judiciary is the paramount
branch in constitutional interpretation has gained wide currency among the courts and
commentators.128 In Cooper v. Aaron, for instance, the Supreme Court took the Marbury
doctrine one step further and declared, “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition
of the law of the Constitution.”129 This theory of judicial supremacy has been criticized by
a small but growing number of constitutional law scholars, but even these critics concede
124
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that judicial supremacy is an accurate description of the current norm of constitutional
interpretation. 130
Even if we consider the judiciary as the first among equals in constitutional
interpretation, however, it would still not explain why the judiciary should exercise this
function to the complete exclusion of the other branches.131 Indeed, as a matter of
institutional design, the courts are poorly equipped to address many constitutional
questions. For instance, in addition to the case and controversy requirement, a host of
other procedural and constitutional hurdles like standing, the power of Congress to
control the jurisdiction of federal courts, ripeness, and deferential standards of review
guarantee that only a limited number of constitutional controversies ever end up before
the courts.132 As a practical matter, this means the political branches will often play a
more significant role than the courts in resolving many constitutional controversies.
Indeed, these obstacles to judicial review tend to be even more pronounced in the foreign
affairs realm,133 which means that even if we exclude the political question as a
consideration, the opportunity of the courts to adjudicate on foreign affairs controversies
would still be fairly limited.
In addition to the institutional considerations described above, other factors
bolster the justification for an independent political branch review of certain
constitutional questions. Like the courts, the political branches also have an obligation to
conform their actions to the dictates of the Constitution. Courts have recognized that this
obligation entails a measure of judicial deference to the judgment of the political branches
on constitutional questions.134 Importantly, this deference signifies that even in the post130
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Cooper era, the courts recognize that constitutional interpretation continues to be a joint
enterprise amongst the three branches of government. As put by the Supreme Court in
Nixon v. United States, “In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch
of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its
powers by any branch is due great respect from the others.”135
In light of all these considerations, the assumption of judicial monopoly implicit
in Franck’s analysis does not match up with the reality of American constitutional
practice. Significantly, far from simply being a judicial aberration foisted upon the
American legal structure by judges sympathetic to a monarchical legal system, the
political question doctrine fits rather comfortably within a legal tradition where the courts
simply do not have either the resources or the opportunity to resolve all constitutional
controversies. Hence, rather than treat the political question doctrine as simply a
constitutional aberration, the proper analysis would ask which branch is in a better
position to perform the relevant adjudicative or interpretive function. This is especially
true in the context of foreign affairs where there has been a long tradition of judicial
deference to the political branches. The real challenge is, of course, to come up with a
more coherent framework than is currently available for distinguishing those foreign
affairs controversies that properly qualify as political questions from those that do not. On
this particular issue, Franck’s approach provides little or no guidance.
Curiously enough, Franck does seem to concede that the courts may have at least
one institutional disadvantage vis a vis the political branches in foreign affairs issues. He
couches this disadvantage in “evidentiary” terms, however, which he claims involve the
difficulties courts face when “drawn into an assessment of those rather special
circumstances that constitute the field of international relations.”136 Drawing upon the
experience of German courts, he argues that courts could overcome these difficulties if
they reformulate political questions as evidentiary problems, which the courts would then
review under a deferential standard.137
It is not clear, however, what Franck really makes of the evidentiary obstacles he
believes the courts face in foreign affairs, or how his proposal addresses these evidentiary
problems. For instance, is it his theory that if the judiciary had access to evidence
discussing the underlying causes of the Vietnamese civil war, including the influence of
communist ideology, that it would be in a better position to decide whether the executive
branch’s undeclared war in Vietnam was a constitutionally acceptable option? What of
the issue of how to deal with the legal implications of state succession, or the recognition
of foreign governments? Is Franck suggesting that if the judiciary had more evidence from
the political branches regarding the causes of the dissolution of Yugoslavia at the end of
the cold war, it would be better positioned to decide whether Slovenia or Croatia should
135
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accede to the sovereign debts of the former Yugoslavia, rather than Bosnia-Herzegovina?
138

The precise foundation of Franck’s assumption is unclear, but his proposal to
convert the political question doctrine to an evidentiary standard turns out be a
makeweight solution. Franck concedes that the German model he espouses so generously
does not necessarily produce outcomes that are significantly different from what occurs
currently under the American system. Apparently, although the German courts claim to
adjudicate on the merits, they rarely ever set aside the decisions of the political branches
in foreign affairs. As Franck observes: “In its theoretical pronouncements, neither [the
American or German] judiciary is candid about what it is doing. The German judges
sound more assertive, just as their American counterparts . . . , than they really are.”139
Nonetheless, Franck still thinks the German system is preferable because “it provides a
thread of jurisprudence that is pursued with far greater consistency than in the American
practice.” 140 If this is true, however, then Franck’s seeming infuriation with the American
model is puzzling. Why would he recommend a wholesale dismantling of a doctrine with a
rich historical lineage, simply to replace it with another that is just as ineffectual?
Furthermore, Franck’s suggested antidote to the evidentiary problem underscores
the difficulty of judicial involvement in foreign affairs. For instance, upon closer
examination, it becomes evident that Franck is not so much concerned with the
evidentiary difficulties courts face in foreign affairs as he is concerned with the kind of
policy judgments that political actors exercise when they are faced with certain kinds of
evidence.141 Whether those policy judgments are inappropriate, however, depends in turn
on some kind of understanding of how different state actors interact in the international
environment. But who has the capacity to understand better how states interact in the
international system -- the political branches or the courts? Or put differently, are courts
properly equipped to decipher whether there is a proper fit between the evidence in a
foreign affairs dispute and the kind of norms that govern the interaction of states at the
international level? Ultimately, Franck does not address the competency of the courts to
make these sorts of determinations.
138
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The Liberalist Response and its Limitations

While internationalists like Franck would prefer to see the courts eliminate the
political question doctrine in foreign affairs, other commentators have suggested that a
more moderate approach: that the doctrine remain but that the scope of its application be
substantially curtailed in foreign affairs disputes. One prominent school of thought that
advocates this middle-of-the-road approach is the international relations school of
liberalism.142 At the heart of liberalist approach is the belief that liberal states interact
with each other under a framework of “complex interdependence,” in which the various
“societies” are “connected by ‘multiple channels’ of communication and action that are
‘transgovernmental’ rather than formally ‘interstate.’” 143 Among such states, the
liberalists contend, “foreign and domestic issues are most convergent,” thus, the courts in
such states should not defer to the political branches on issues involving other liberal
states.144
Liberalists recognize, of course, that there are competing alternative explanations
of the international society of sovereign states.145 One such competing approach has been
the international relations school of realism, which has been the dominant approach to
approach in the United States over the past two millennia.146 The realist approach
“accept[s] a model of states as unitary actors whose external behavior is unrelated to
unitary structure and purpose.” 147 Liberalists reject the fundamental tenets of realism
when it comes to describing the interaction among liberal states, but concede that nonliberal states interact with each other and liberal states under a framework that
“conform[s] much more to the traditional realist mode.”148 Thus, according to the
liberalists, courts should continue to apply the political question doctrine to foreign affairs
disputes that involve non-liberal states.149
To a certain degree, the liberalists are correct that international relations theory
can help us understand why courts treat foreign affairs differently from domestic issues.
For instance, if you take a realist perspective of the international environment, then it is
pointless to advocate judicial intervention in foreign affairs because the model of the
world you are using eschews the significance of any kind of legal norms or principles.
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Indeed, in invoking the political question doctrine, some courts have relied explicitly on a
realist vision of international politics. In a recent Seventh Circuit case discussing the
political question doctrine, for instance, Judge Posner opined that the conduct of foreign
affairs involved “the unjudicial mindset that goes by the name Realpolitik.”150
Assuming the liberalist description of international society is correct, however, it
is still not altogether clear why the courts should play any more of a significant role in
foreign affairs. Indeed, the liberalist project runs up against a fundamentally intractable
problem: Who gets to decide whether or not a country qualifies as a liberal state? The
liberalists seem to assume that the courts should make these determinations.151 But what
exactly would be the basis for granting the courts such broad policymaking power?
Nothing in Article III would seem to support vesting such foreign affairs power in the
judicial branch. Moreover, from an institutional competence standpoint, it would also not
make much sense to give the courts the authority to determine whether or not a specific
country meets the liberalist’s criteria for liberalism. Finally, there is hardly any historical
precedent that would support such a broad expansion of the judicial function. The
liberalists claim that the courts already make similar distinctions when they have to assess
the adequacy of foreign forums in forum non conveniens cases.152 But this comparison
crumbles upon closer inspection. In determining whether or not to refrain from hearing a
case because of the availability of a better alternative forum, a court may consider
whether “the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or
unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all.”153 However, that kind of determination is a far
cry from a court making a policy determination that a specific country’s political and
economic system does not sufficiently meet some undefined and invariably subjective
threshold of liberalism.
In any event, even if the courts could make these kinds of determinations, it is still
unclear why it would make sense to do away with the political question doctrine only with
respect to issues that concern liberal countries, and not others. As an example, let us
examine one scenario where the political question doctrine frequently comes up: the
recognition of foreign governments. Assume, for a moment, that Basque separatists in
Northern Spain succeed briefly in their quest to secede and set up an interim
150
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government, but their short-lived secession is crushed violently by the Spanish military.
The President of the United States then decides that because of Spain’s actions he or she
is no longer going to recognize the Spanish government. Should a court, in the course of a
legal dispute that involves the Spanish government, be able to set aside the President’s
non-recognition decision if it makes an independent determination that Spain is a liberal
country? I do not think that even the most ardent opponent of the political question
doctrine would agree that courts should have that kind of authority.154
The liberalist approach does not seem to fare any better when applied to other
issues, such as the executive branch’s war-making powers. For instance, why should the
courts intervene if the President decides to launch an undeclared military campaign
against a liberal country, but then abstain if the President decides to take a similar action
against a non-liberal state? Assuming that the perceived threat to national security is the
same in both instances, is there anything inherent in liberalism that would make a
declaration or congressional approval necessary in one context, and not in the other? In
the end, using a dichotomy between liberal and non-liberal states to narrow the scope of
the political question doctrine, as the liberalist proposes, would likely raise more problems
than does exist under the current doctrine.
III.

A BALANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCIES APPROACH

This Part proposes a balance of institutional competencies approach to the
political question doctrine in foreign affairs. When judicial abstention and deference in
foreign affairs is understood through the prism of the balance of institutional
competencies, its contours become clearer and more logical. As used here, a balance of
institutional competencies model envisions that when faced with a foreign affairs
controversy, the courts weigh their institutional advantage in resolving certain kinds of
disputes against that of the political branches before deciding on the appropriate amount
of deference to accord the political branches’ judgment.
For several reasons discussed in Section A below, a balance of institutional
competencies approach provides the most coherent explanation for the pervasive
application of the political question doctrine in foreign affairs. But while the courts have
often invoked institutional competence factors in deciding whether to abstain from
foreign affairs controversies, they have often done so at a level of generality that does not
provide a meaningful basis for discerning the scope of the doctrine. That the factors the
courts consider in invoking the doctrine may prove inadequate does not mean, however,
that no principled basis for distinguishing political questions exists. At a fairly abstract
level, one can be reasonably sure that any explanation will rest on some notion of the
impropriety of judicial involvement due to the substantive nature of the underlying
dispute.
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Section B shows that a balance of institutional competencies also provides a
definition of the proper scope of abstention and deference among different foreign affairs
controversies. Rather than treat the judicial doctrines of abstention and deference as
differences in kind, this section demonstrates that these two doctrines reflect differences
in degree.
A.

The Comparative Institutional Disadvantages of the Courts

As compared to the political branches, the courts suffer from clear institutional
disadvantages in resolving constitutional foreign affairs controversies, including
controversies regarding the allocation of foreign affairs powers. These include: (1)
obstacles to a judicial definition of the scope of foreign affairs powers; (2) the lack of
judicial authoritativeness in resolving foreign affairs controversies; and (3) the fact that
the costs of judicial intervention in foreign affairs outweigh the benefits.
1.

Obstacles to a Judicial Definition of the Scope of the Foreign Affairs Powers

One of the most obvious and persistent problems in judicial interpretation of the
constitutional foreign affairs powers concerns the role of definition. In other words, the
Constitution is unambiguously silent as to the meaning of the relevant terms that define
the scope of the foreign affairs powers, such as “war” or “treaties.” Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has yet to supply its own understanding of what these terms mean from a
constitutional standpoint.155 Understandably, without the benefit of any guidance as to
the definition of these terms, lower courts have been reluctant to resolve controversies
regarding the constitutional allocation of the foreign affairs powers. Perhaps this explains
why, in refusing to hear such controversies, the courts often declare that the underlying
issues involve the “lack of judicially manageable or discoverable standards.”156
In many respects, it is not difficult to understand why the courts have balked at
imposing any substantive limitations on the scope of the foreign affairs powers. The
political branches have a demonstrable institutional advantage over the courts in
understanding the international political norms that inform the substantive meaning of
the various terms underlying the foreign affairs powers. The early constitutional history of
the foreign affairs powers strongly suggest that the framers understood the constitutional
meaning of these terms would be consistent with that of early British constitutional

155

See Made in the U.S.A Foundation v. U.S., 242 F.3d at 1305 (“Remarkably, although perhaps
not altogether surprisingly, the United States Supreme Court has never in our nation’s history seen fit to
address the question of what exactly constitutes and distinguishes “treaties,” as that term is used in Art. II,
§ 2, from “alliances,” “confederations,” “compacts,” or “agreements,” as those terms are employed in Art. I,
§ 10”); see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d at 26-27(surveying the case law and observing that no court had
attempted to define the constitutional meaning of war).
156
See, e.g., Made in the U.S.A. Foundation, 242 F.3d at 1315 (holding that difficulty in defining
treaty suggested that resolution of dispute was not amenable to judicially manageable standards).

The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs

34

practice and the prevailing international norms at the time.157 In the international
context, however, the meanings of these foreign affairs terms are dynamic and tend to
evolve with changing conditions and the demands of the international environment.
Since the political branches are better suited than the courts in tracking these norms, it
makes sense that the courts would also defer to the political branches’ understanding of
the scope of the foreign affairs powers. More importantly, as a descriptive matter, many of
the disputes that implicate foreign affairs involve considerations of “realpolitik” that are
largely absent in domestic controversies.
The original meaning of the constitutional foreign affairs powers can be gleaned
from the works of leading eighteenth century international law scholars, such as
Emmerich de Vattel, Hugo Grotius, and William Blackstone.158 These early writers
justified an understanding of the foreign affairs powers that was connected to the
prevailing international norms of the eighteenth century. For instance, Blackstone,
Vattel, Grotius, and Pufendorf all viewed the “Declare War” provision as instrumental to
determining whether a hostility was truly public and hence eligible to be governed by the
customary laws of war.159 Accordingly, these authors made a distinction between armed
hostilities that the sovereign state enters into as a public unit and armed actions of private
groups commonly known as privateers.160 This distinction was particularly important
157
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because privateers did not enjoy the same protections that were normally accorded lawful
combatants in a state of war, which included immunity from prosecution for activities
that would otherwise be considered criminal in peacetime.161 Indeed, as Blackstone
described it, such “unauthorized [private] volunteers” were to be treated no differently
than “pirates and robbers.”162 Blackstone recognized one exception, however, where a
sovereign might sanction private hostilities under international law. Letters of marquee
and reprisal were available in circumstances where “the subjects of one state are
oppressed and injured by those of another; and justice is denied by that state to which the
oppressor belongs.”163 If such a letter was issued, the recipient could “seise the bodies or
goods of the subjects of the offending state, wherever they be found, until satisfaction be
made.” 164
As espoused by these commentators, however, the international norms governing
the meaning of these foreign affairs terms were not static. Indeed, with the passage of time
and a changing international environment, the meaning of some of these terms evolved
considerably, or even became obsolete. For instance, the granting of letters of marquee
and reprisal became proscribed under international law in the early part of the nineteenth
century.165 Finally, the notion of what a “declared war” entails has also evolved
considerably. For instance, one commentator has argued that that in the eighteenth
century declarations “generally meant formal announcements to the enemy with proper

is matter rather of magnanimity than right) but that it may be certainly clear that the war is not undertaken
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ceremony, usually in his capital.” 166 But this understanding did not even govern the
meaning of war at the time of the founding.167 More significantly, as a matter of historical
practice, Congress has rarely exercised its constitutional authority to declare war.168 Thus,
for all practical purposes, the “declare war” clause has very much evolved into a mere
constitutional formality.
The constant evolution in international norms underscores the comparative
institutional incompetence of the courts in interpreting the allocation of foreign affairs
powers. Importantly, although the proponents of judicial supremacy have offered a variety
of justifications as to why courts are institutionally superior to the political branches in
constitutional interpretation, none of those justifications seem to apply here. For
example, Professors Alexander and Schauer argue that we should prefer the Supreme
Court over Congress because the settlement function requires stability “over time as well
as across institutions,” and that courts respect the principle of stare decisis while Congress
does not.169 Not many would quarrel with this description of the institutional differences
between the Court and the political branches. What is less obvious, however, is how these
differences translate into an institutional advantage when the interpretive task involves
defining the scope of the foreign affairs powers. Indeed, given the fluidity with which the
international norms that inform our foreign affairs powers change over time, these factors
may very likely prove to be a significant institutional liability. Stability may very well
prove to be important in a context where individual rights are at stake. In such
circumstances, stability “provides the benefits of authoritative settlement, as well as the
related . . . benefits of inducing socially beneficial cooperative behavior and providing
166
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solutions to Prisoner’s Dilemmas and other problems of coordination.”170 In the context of
foreign affairs, however, an authoritative settlement of the law across time and
institutions is less likely to produce the optimal interpretive outcome. Rather, it will likely
result in a constitutional straight-jacket over the decision-making space of the political
branches in the international arena.
On the other hand, because the political branches are not bound by the same
institutional constraints the courts face, they are better positioned to respond to changing
norms in international relations. As one commentator has observed, “Congress . . .
frequently makes determinations as to the shifts in public opinion, beliefs, and ideals.
Because of Congress’s structural superiority in these tasks, it should take a larger role in
interpreting those clauses of the Constitution that are meant to evolve over time.”171
Similarly, in the context of executive interpretation of constitutional provisions involving
foreign affairs, Professor David Strauss stresses that courts should defer to executive
pronouncements on foreign affairs because the courts “lack[] the capacity to make the
necessary judgments.”172
The close relationship between the constitutional foreign affairs powers and the
norms of international law also highlights the need for judicial restraint in foreign affairs
controversies. As suggested above, the substantive meaning of the underlying foreign
affairs powers can only be understood in the context of international law norms. Since the
Supreme Court’s decision in Paquette Habana,173 however, courts have recognized that the
political branches are not compelled by the Constitution to comply with international
law.174 Given this reality, it would be anomalous if the courts, while interpreting the scope
of the foreign affairs powers, were able to compel the political branches to comply with
customary international law. For instance, it would be clearly inappropriate for a court to
override an executive branch decision not to recognize a foreign state if such a court
makes an independent determination that the executive branch’s decision did not
conform to customary international law.175 Indeed, even opponents of the political
question doctrine, such as Louis Henkin, concede that it would be inappropriate for the
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courts to invalidate foreign affairs decisions of the political branches on the grounds that
such decisions violate international law.176
The positive reality of the international political environment supports the
institutional analysis that questions regarding foreign affairs are to be resolved by the
political branches, not the courts. In particular, an analysis of how states interact in the
international realm suggests that some of the international norms may be of a non-legal
character. As used here, “international norms” loosely connotes a shared understanding
among the international community as to the norms that govern their interactions. It is
important to note, however, that a positive description of the norms of international
behavior among nation states may often deviate significantly from the prescriptive norms
of international law.177 Indeed, the prevailing political science model of international
relations of realism eschews the significance of international law as a factor in describing
how states interact. According to realists, the international political realm is characterized
by anarchy and involves a “brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take
advantage of each other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other.”178 Realism
views the international society of states through the prism of anarchy in which each state
strives for its “own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination.” 179
To the realist, international law does not play an autonomous role in influencing state
behavior, but merely reflects the interests of the dominant states in the international
arena.180 Realism has come under increasing scrutiny lately by alternative theories seeking
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to explain the structure of international politics.181 One does not have to be a proponent
of realism, however, to recognize “the fact that the international legal system, lacking a
centralized enforcement body with reliable coercive authority, must depend upon politics
for its efficacy far more than does any body of domestic legal rules.”182
In the sense that the terms of the foreign affairs powers depend on evolving norms
that develop in an international system characterized by anarchy and not hierarchy, they
are significantly different from other domestic constitutional provisions. Because nation
states in the international context do not face the same kinds of binding legal constraints
as domestic actors, they often require a much more flexible policy space in which to
address the exigencies of the state’s existence in the international realm. Importantly,
unlike in the foreign affairs realm, the political branches are not usually allowed to pursue
pure political expedience in the domestic context by privileging one interest group over
another.183 This distinction implies that, unlike the domestic context, the legal and
political atmosphere in which foreign policy decisions are made is often not amenable to
judicial resolution.
Opponents of the special deference courts pay the political branches in foreign
affairs are quick to point out, however, that the courts have managed to derive judicially
manageable standards from the vaguest and most complex domestic legal provisions.184
This kind of reasoning obscures the issue. The difficulty in deriving judicial standards in
foreign affairs controversies is not necessarily due to the complexity or vagueness of the
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underlying foreign affairs issues, but because the very nature of these foreign affairs powers
depend on considerations of “Realpolitik.” Moreover, the meaning of these terms also
tends to vacillate with changes in the international environment. For instance, when
confronted with the eighteenth century threat of piracy on international waters, the
President and Congress implemented innovative devices to this situation at the time,
including interventions against countries that harbored pirates.185 In the current
international security climate, however, the issue of piracy is no longer a concern. Today,
the United States faces a new and different set of security challenges in the international
realm, such as the threat of international terrorism,186 and there is no need to assume that
the Constitution would constrain the political branches from developing new methods for
tackling these problems.187 Of course, one might object to this analysis and argue that not
all issues of international politics necessarily implicate national security concerns. The
response is while this may be true, it is hardly the province of the courts to make that
determination. In the end, the question of the difference between national security and
other kinds of issues turns out not to be one that is easily amenable to legal
categorization.188
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Both the writings of the founding generation and the prevailing case law reinforce
the notion that the political branches should have wide latitude in responding to the new
challenges of the international arena without any judicially imposed limitations. In the
Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton concluded that the scope of the foreign affairs
powers should be construed flexibly enough to accommodate all possible situations that
might pose a threat to national security:
These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee
or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The
circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason
no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care
of it is committed.189
Reaffirming Hamilton’s concerns, the Supreme Court has held on several occasions that it
is the political branches, and not the courts, that should make determinations regarding
the existence and nature of a national security threat.190 Consistent with this approach,
the Court has also determined that arrangements between the political branches
regarding the allocation of authority in foreign affairs are not subject to the same
constitutional limits on delegation that exist in the domestic sphere.191
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Finally, a related but equally significant concern is that the compared to the
political branches, the courts lack the institutional capacity to evaluate the relevance of
evidence when their understanding of the applicable norms governing such evidence is
incomplete. This problem is distinct from the issue as to whether or not the courts have
access to the kind of evidence that will enable them to make an informed decision on
foreign affairs controversies. Courts and commentators often suggest that courts should
not have access to such evidence because it involves sensitive and secret matters of
national security.192 But as one commentator has argued, one possible remedy to the latter
problem would be to present such evidence in camera.193 If we assume, however, that the
courts are institutionally incapable of evaluating and understanding the norms of the
international context in which the controversy arises, then increased access to evidence
would not cure the problem. In such circumstances, the difficulty with judicial
involvement stems not from the lack of evidence, but from the fact that the courts lack
meaningful standards to evaluate such evidence. In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Justice
Jackson seemed to acknowledge this aspect of the judiciary’s institutional incompetence
on foreign affairs issues:
It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should
review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly
held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive
confidences. But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of
executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are
wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the
government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve
large elements of prophecy.194
Upon analysis, Justice Jackson’s opinion reveals that the Court was simply aware of its
limitations as a decisional body to review matters where legally discernible criteria for
evaluating the evidence were not available.
2.

The Judiciary’s Lack of Authoritativeness in Foreign Affairs

In many contexts, the courts are reluctant to involve themselves in foreign affairs
controversies because of the perceived lack of institutional authoritativeness or
legitimacy. The notion that the courts may invoke the doctrine in order to avoid a
matters of foreign affairs-- must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in
domestic areas”).
192
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appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence”); CurtissWright, 299 U.S. at 320 (“Secrecy in respect of information gathered by [the President] may be highly
necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.”).
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confrontation with the political branches is not entirely new. Indeed, one of the rationales
that Professor Bickel put forth in support of the political question doctrine involved what
he described as “the anxiety, not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as
that perhaps that it should but will not be . . .”195 Not much of the commentary has
focused, however, on the specific relationship between the substantive nature of foreign
affairs and the institutional authoritativeness of the courts.
Commentators have largely rejected the “institutional legitimacy” rationale even
while acknowledging its explanatory power in certain political question doctrine cases.196
At bottom, most of these commentators argue that the mere fear of being ignored by the
political branches cannot justify the abdication of the judicial function in “high stakes” or
controversial cases. As explained by Professor Redish, “it is highly unlikely that the
dangers of adherence to a decision would be so great as to justify the risk of political
backlash that the government’s disregard of a Supreme Court decision would entail.”197 If
the courts’ reluctance to adjudicate on foreign affairs issues were cast as a mere
opportunistic retreat from a clash with the political branches, then Professor Redish’s
concerns would be justified. In the context of the judiciary’s limitations in a system of
separated powers, however, those concerns seem misplaced.
To critics of the political question doctrine, such as Professor Redish, the question
is not so much on whether the courts have the requisite institutional legitimacy to review
foreign affairs matters, but whether they risk diminishing whatever institutional legitimacy
they possess when they do so. Indeed, these commentators assume as given the judiciary’s
institutional authoritativeness to rule on any legal matter that comes before it. That
assumption, however, is wrong. Rather than presuppose the judiciary’s legitimacy to
exercise a particular function, the proper analysis should focus on the source of the courts’
institutional legitimacy to engage in judicial review generally, and then ask whether such
institutional legitimacy extends to foreign affairs cases. As demonstrated below, one
significant misgiving that the courts may have about reviewing foreign affairs cases is that
is that they simply lack the requisite institutional legitimacy to address such issues.
In the past two decades, the Supreme Court and commentators have examined in
great detail the basis of the institutional legitimacy of courts. Social scientists like Tom
Tyler and Gregory Mitchell have drawn upon extensive empirical evidence to
demonstrate that courts, like other political institutions, “need[] a mandate entitling
them to undertake the resolution of a controversial public policy issue.”198 In the absence
195
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of such a mandate, these commentators conclude that the courts will lack the requisite
authoritativeness that ensures public compliance with judicial decisions.199 Similarly,
Walter Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus have argued that public consensus is integral to
the judiciary’s legitimacy: “In a political system ostensibly based on consent, the Court’s
legitimacy . . . must ultimately spring from public acceptance of . . . of its various roles.”200
In Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey,201 a plurality of the Supreme Court
explicitly endorsed this theory of its institutional legitimacy. “The Court’s power lies . . .
in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s
acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and what it
demands.”202
In the domestic affairs context, the Court draws its legitimacy largely from its
mandate to resolve issues related to protecting constitutional rights of individuals and
underrepresented groups.203 The Casey plurality concluded that the courts are able to
sustain this legitimacy by “making legally principled decisions under circumstances in
which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.”204
In addition to general public support of the courts, the political branches also have an
incentive to acquiesce to the judiciary’s institutional role of judicial review. Judicial
review serves as a very important legitimating function for the activities of the political
branches. As Professor Choper explains, this legitimating function “is critically important
for national unity; that public knowledge that an independent tribunal has approved the
political assumptions of authority adds dignity to the laws of the central government and
inspires confidence that it is acting within its constitutional boundaries.”205 In any event,
although the scope of such review may be subject to debate, the courts nonetheless enjoy
a general presumption of legitimacy when they adjudicate on domestic constitutional
questions. There is no reason to assume, however, that this presumption of legitimacy
extends to foreign affairs cases.
In the context of foreign affairs, the political branches have very little need for the
judiciary’s legitimating function. More importantly, the courts seem to understand its
R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19-39 (discussing the relationship between legitimacy and
compliance).
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limited utility in constitutional foreign affairs disputes. One commentator has used the
metaphor of a “faustian bargain” to describe this understanding between the courts and
the political branches in foreign affairs.206 In this bargain, the judiciary essentially ceded
the power to review foreign affairs issues in return for an understanding that the political
branches would consent to its authority to review domestic constitutional issues.207 While
the metaphor of a faustian bargain may seem like an overstatement, it nonetheless
captures the underpinnings of the longstanding historical relationship between the
political branches and the Supreme Court regarding the allocation of constitutional
authority.208 From an institutional perspective, the political branches do not seem to have
much to gain by acquiescing to judicial oversight in foreign affairs. Unlike legal
controversies in the domestic realm, the political branches do not seem to have any need
for an impartial tribunal to dispense judgments regarding the scope of their foreign affairs
activities. This observation is especially true when such activities take place in an
international realm where nation states do not always abide by the norms of international
law and where there is no centralized decision-making authority. In that realm, the
political branches may decide to act of a legal obligation in certain contexts, but not in
others. Understandably, in many disputes involving foreign affairs issues, the government
has usually asked the courts to abstain from reviewing the issue rather than request a
particular outcome on the merits.209
Furthermore, unlike in domestic constitutional controversies, it is also doubtful
that the judiciary can draw on the popular underpinnings of its legitimacy should the
political branches ignore its foreign affairs determinations. As one commentator has
explained, the public appetite for judicial involvement in international issues is not
particularly strong.210 The judiciary’s lack of popular legitimacy in foreign affairs is
particularly understandable when the relevant controversy touches on matters of national
security. As demonstrated above, in matters involving the domestic operations of the
government, the court plays a very important role in legitimizing the activities of the
other branches, as well as providing a reliable mechanism for the resolution of disputes
between private individuals. When matters touch on the very existence of the state,
however, such as when the state faces an external threat, the justifications for judicial
involvement correspondingly diminish.211 Thus, far from getting popular support in the
206
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event of a confrontation with the political branches, it is more likely that the courts will
face public criticism for intervening improperly in foreign affairs or jeopardizing national
security.
Finally, there is another significant reason why the courts might believe that they
are unable to enforce their decision against the political branches in foreign affairs cases.
Simply put, given the breadth of the political branches’ authority in foreign affairs, they
often possess tools that would enable them to avoid judicial determinations adverse to
their interests. A survey of some of some real and hypothetical cases involving disputes
over the allocation of foreign affairs will help illustrate this point. For instance, in
Goldwater v. Carter, the issue at stake was whether the President had to submit a formal
termination of a treaty for Senate ratification.212 In the end, the Court refused to require
the President to do so, but could not garner a majority behind any single justification.213
Assume, however, that the Court reached the contrary conclusion that the President
could not terminate the treaty without the approval of a supermajority of the Senate. The
problem with this hypothetical outcome is that the President could effectively avoid the
Court’s determination by refusing to enforce the treaty, or by independently making a
decision to breach the treaty. It is widely understood that the President has the authority
to breach treaty commitments with another country, if he so chooses.214 But if this is the
case, then it does not make much sense for the courts to try to adjudicate the question of
whether the President alone can formally terminate such treaties.
In addition, similar constraints on the interpretive authority of the courts can also
be demonstrated in the war powers context. Assume that pursuant to the “declare war”
clause, a court rules that a President cannot engage in war without prior congressional
approval. Presumably, such a court would concede, as even most pro-Congress scholars in
the war-powers debate do, that the President still retains the residual authority to engage
in a defensive war without congressional approval.215 What happens then if the President
launches an offensive war without congressional approval, but insists that it is really a
defensive war? Should the courts have the authority to distinguish between defensive and
offensive wars? If so, what criteria or standards should they employ? In the end, such a
system would likely prove unworkable in practice. For instance, once the President starts
a war, it is difficult, if not almost impossible, to make post-hoc determinations from a legal
212
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point of view as to whether the war is properly an offensive or defensive war. Moreover,
inviting the courts to make such a distinction would invariably draw the courts into
making a determination as to whether another country poses a significant enough
“offensive” threat to United States security to warrant a defensive reaction by the
President. It seems obvious, however, that such a determination would be clearly beyond
the institutional competence of the courts.
3.

The Costs of Judicial Intervention in Foreign Affairs Outweigh the Benefits

In many circumstances, the political question doctrine can be justified by the fact
that the costs of judicial intervention in foreign affairs are considerably high while the
benefits, if any, are entirely speculative. At first glance, this rationale seems problematic
because any attempt to calculate the costs of judicial intervention would very likely run
up against methodological difficulties, especially since there seems to be no clear criteria
for comparing judicial versus political branch performance in foreign affairs controversies.
Nonetheless, there are certain institutional considerations that warrant a conclusion that
judicial intervention in foreign affairs controversies is very likely to impose serious costs
on the administration of foreign policy. One such consideration involves the fact that the
courts are not capable of understanding or controlling the effects of their decisions on
foreign countries, nor do they have any control over the reaction of foreign countries to
their decisions. The second but related consideration is that the various remedial devices
available to the courts, such as injunctions, writs, declaratory relief, and contempt orders,
are particularly ill-suited to matters relating to foreign affairs.
a.

Assessing the Costs of Judicial Intervention

The costs associated with judicial error are most evident in cases involving
controversies over the allocation of war powers. First, the nature of such controversies
often requires immediate attention, and it may prove costly for the political branches to
await the outcome of a judicial determination. Second, to the extent that a determination
will turn on whether the executive branch has produced sufficient enough evidence to
warrant the commencement of military hostilities without congressional authorization,
the consequences of judicial error can be extremely high, if not catastrophic. Imagine, for
instance, that the Supreme Court sets forth a standard for war powers controversies that
requires the President to demonstrate that a foreign country imposes an imminent threat
to national security before he can commence military hostilities without congressional
authorization. If the Court errs in its assessment of the severity of an external threat,
however, its judgment could leave the country defenseless in the event of an attack. Such
difficulties underscore an important difference between domestic controversies and
foreign controversies. In a domestic controversy, the costs of judicial error are rarely ever
that high and the courts often have ample opportunity to correct their previous
interpretive errors.
This risk of judicial error is very much implicit in the decisions that treated the
legality of the Vietnam War as a political question. For example, with respect to whether
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the President’s decision to mine the harbors of North Vietnam constituted an
unauthorized escalation of war under the War Powers Act, the Second Circuit articulated
the risk of that court’s involvement in these terms:
Judges, deficient in military knowledge, lacking vital information upon which to
assess the nature of battlefield decisions, and sitting thousands of miles from the
field of action, cannot reasonably or appropriately determine whether a specific
military operation constitutes an “escalation” of the war or is merely a new tactical
approach within a continuing strategic plan . . . Are the courts required to oversee
the conduct of the war on a daily basis, away from the scene of action? In this
instance, it was the President’s view that the mining of North Vietnam's harbors
was necessary to preserve the lives of American soldiers in South Vietnam and to
bring the war to a close. History will tell whether or not that assessment was
correct, but without the benefit of such extended hindsight we are powerless to
know.216
Therefore, the court concluded that these kinds of questions should be appropriately
addressed to the political branches.
One might object and argue that the circumstances described above would only
apply when war or imminent threats to national security issues are at stake. While
national security concerns best illustrate the dangers of judicial intervention, framing this
factor exclusively in terms of war is not appropriate. First, as explained in Section A
above, it is often difficult to separate national security issues from other soft diplomacy
concerns.217 Second, and more importantly, the costs of judicial intervention stems not so
much from the fact that war may be a factor, but that the courts are incapable of
predicting whether foreign nations may be affected by a judicial decision, or how such
nations may react to such a decision. This latter consideration extends to issues affecting
international trade and commerce, as well as international security. As explained by
Justice Brennan in Contained Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Bd.,218 a case
involving a tax dispute, “th[e] Court has little competence in determining precisely when
foreign nations will be offended by particular acts.”219 Thus, in the absence of a more
precise understanding of the foreign interests that may be adversely affected by a judicial
determination, the courts have appropriately left the resolution of such foreign affairs
disputes to the political branches.
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One objection to this explanation might be that concerns regarding the effects of
litigation on unrelated parties often come up in the domestic context, but that courts do
not necessarily defer to the political branches in such cases. For instance, some
commentators have described the judicial role in the prison reform litigation that started
in the late 1960s as involving complex and multifaceted consequences that extended
beyond the traditional adjudicatory model.220 The late Abram Chayes aptly characterized
these proceedings as one “which ha[d] widespread effects on persons not before the court
and require[d] the judge’s continuous involvement in administration and
implementation.”221 These domestic affairs controversies are significantly different from
those affecting foreign affairs, however, because the non-party entities affected by judicial
decisions in the domestic context operate largely within the same legal framework as the
courts. On the other hand, in the foreign affairs context, the affected entities lie outside
the jurisdiction of the domestic courts. More importantly, unlike in the domestic context,
considerations of power often weigh as heavily as legal factors in determining the norms of
inter-state behavior.222 Therefore, there is greater risk that a court’s determination in a
foreign affairs dispute could have an impact on a wider range of actors outside the court’s
jurisdiction than it would in a domestic dispute.
The significance of power in international relations also underscores the other
related reason why the involvement of courts in foreign affairs might be detrimental to
foreign policy. This rationale involves the inherent limitations of the various remedial
tools available to the courts when they confront foreign affairs controversies. For
instance, in many international disputes or controversies, an approach that focuses on
power-based diplomacy and negotiation may be more advantageous to the states involved
than rule-based adjudications.223 Even one of the leading proponents of a rule-based
approach in international affairs admits that “in practice the observable international
institutions and legal systems involve some mixture of both [rule-based and power-based
diplomatic approaches].”224 Given the continuous relevance of power as a factor in
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international relations, the remedial devices available to the courts, such as injunctions,
writs, and declaratory relief, are simply inadequate for addressing foreign affairs
controversies. This is because judicial remedies are often designed to address the concerns
of conventional adjudication, which as Professor Fuller has explained, almost always
involve “claims of right or accusation of faults.”225 In the international system, however,
issues cannot be broken down neatly into legally cognizable wrong or right answers. Thus,
in such circumstances, the affected actors may prefer a more flexible and open-ended
resolution of a problem than would be achieved through a decision based on rules and
standards. Understandably, courts have occasionally invoked this non-rule based aspect of
international diplomacy to justify abstaining from foreign affairs controversies.226
b.

Assessing the Purported Benefits of Judicial Intervention

The benefits of judicial intervention in foreign affairs are illusory. Two
assumptions underlie the belief that judicial intervention in foreign affairs controversies
will yield benefits. The first is that the courts will be able to check and control the
“executive usurpation” of congressional authority in foreign affairs better than Congress
has been able to do on its own. The second, which is substantially related to the first, is
that the absence of judicial review necessarily implies the absence of the rule of law in
foreign affairs matters.227 This section will argue that both of these assumptions are
unfounded.
The fundamental problem with the first assumption is that it ignores some basic
attributes of executive-congressional relations in foreign affairs. In the context of a
dispute over the allocation of authority in foreign affairs, Congress has at its disposal a
variety of structural safeguards, such as the spending power, with which it could protect
its foreign affairs prerogative against executive usurpation. Admittedly, such structural
safeguards might also exist in the domestic sphere and the courts do not necessarily defer
to political branch determinations regarding separation of powers disputes in that
realm.228 But as Justice Kennedy observed in his concurrence in United States v. Lopez,229 it
is not clear that Congress has either the incentives or the proper framework to deploy the
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structural safeguards when the prime beneficiaries of the domestic constitutional
constraint are third parties, such as the states.230 In the foreign affairs context, the prime
beneficiaries in allocation of powers disputes are not third parties, but the political
branches themselves. Moreover, as discussed in the previous two sections of this Article,
foreign affairs controversies present other unique challenges to judicial resolution;
therefore, the courts have more reason to defer to any accommodation the political
branches might reach when they compete for foreign affairs authority.
One place where the benefits of judicial intervention are clearly questionable is in
those cases dealing with the constitutional allocation of war powers. Take, for instance,
the argument by opponents of the question doctrine that Congress’s power of the purse is
not sufficient to protect its war powers prerogative. These critics argue that this safeguard
is rarely effective because an appropriations cutoff in the middle of a war would “expose[]
legislators to charges of having stranded soldiers in the field.”231 Assume, for a moment,
that this observation is true. How does judicial intervention in the underlying dispute
change anything? Is a judicial order that enjoins the President from prosecuting a war in
mid-course any less susceptible to political criticism than a congressional decision to cut
off spending? The only difference is that where the public outcry may be targeted at the
legislature in one instance, it would be leveled against the courts in the other. Given this
dimension of the problem, it is not surprising that members of congress occasionally seek
the intervention of the courts in such controversies,232 even when it seems that Congress
has the tools to sufficiently protect its interest on its own. Nonetheless, the courts,
possibly perceptive of Congress’s deflection strategy, have refused to take the bait.
Even some of the most outspoken opponents of the political question doctrine,
such as Professor Franck, have recognized the “political risks” posed by judicial
intervention in war powers disputes.233 Paraphrasing Bickel, Franck characterizes the
problem with issuing injunctive relief as involving “the prospect that such raises the
specter not only that such an order will not be obeyed but, perhaps an even darker
prospect, that it might be, with potentially disastrous consequences for American military
personnel . . ., as well as the court’s legitimacy.”234 Franck suggests as an alternative that
the courts issue declaratory judgments rather than injunctions in cases where a war may
already be in progress.235 The problem with Franck’s intermediate solution is that it does
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little to address the problems of institutional legitimacy and compliance that he links with
injunctive relief. Indeed, one might expect greater instances of non-compliance with
judicial determinations where the proposed judicial remedy is half-hearted and the
consequences for violation are relatively insignificant.
Similarly, the argument that equates the absence of judicial review with the
absence of the rule of law in foreign affairs remains also seems to be incorrect. As argued
previously, there is a rich and longstanding tradition of constitutional interpretation by
the political branches that discredits the judicial exclusivity theory that underlies this
argument.236 Moreover, there is also substantial evidence that demonstrates that this view
of political branch lawlessness is inconsistent with the realities of political branch
interaction in foreign affairs.
Far from ignoring constitutional considerations, the political branches have done
particularly well in defining each branch’s constitutional authority in the administration
of foreign affairs. Interestingly, however, the resultant bargain or division of authority
does not mirror the outcome conventional interpretive theories would predict. For
instance, how Congress exercises its authority over war related matters seems not to be
fixed, but seems to ebb and flow depending on the relative institutional strength and
bargaining position of each branch. As an example, in the aftermath of the President’s
failure to succeed in the Vietnam conflict, Congress was emboldened to pass a series of
laws restricting presidential discretion in war related matters.237 Such historically
contingent swings in authority do not imply, however, that the President and the
Congress have been indifferent to textual language in discerning their respective
constitutional powers under the various foreign affairs provisions. On the contrary,
flagrant attempts by either branch to intrude into the other’s clearly demarcated
constitutional powers are largely uncommon. As Professor Henkin has observed, despite
broad and sweeping claims of executive power in foreign affairs issues, no President has
ever asserted the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, lay and collect
taxes, duties, or imports and excises, or pass domestic criminal laws.238 Significantly, the
President and Congress have maintained these constitutional boundaries in foreign affairs
without hardly any guidance or oversight by the courts.
On the other hand, the political branches routinely struggle with each other over
the allocation of foreign affairs authority where the constitutionally assigned roles of both
branches overlap, or where the scope of the constitutionally assigned roles are ambiguous.
This spectrum where both branches compete for authority is often referred to as the
“twilight zone” of foreign affairs powers.239 The issues that fit within this spectrum include
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those controversies regarding the executive branch’s powers to commence international
hostilities without congressional authorization, or the executive branch’s authority to
enter international agreements without the consent of a supermajority of the Senate.
Understandably, reasonable minds continue to disagree over the scope of political branch
authority on these matters and the prospect of any definitive resolution of these in the
foreseeable future is unlikely.240 Because the Constitution does not prescribe any specific
result in these cases, however, it is not far-fetched to assume that any accommodation
that the political branches might reach regarding the sharing of these foreign affairs
powers would be consistent with what the Constitution demands.
Admittedly, it is true that a judicial determination resolving the scope of these
foreign affairs powers might provide a more precise demarcation of constitutional
authority than does currently exist. Nonetheless, it is not clear that such a bright line rule
would permit the flexibility and latitude necessary for the political branches to respond to
the exigencies of the international system. Moreover, such a judicially imposed resolution
would very likely upset any political equilibrium that the legislative and executive
branches might achieve through the competition for foreign affairs authority. As Professor
Wedgwood has explained, in the absence of such competition, “[a]n unbounded sense of
constitutional entitlement may tempt a beneficiary to act immodestly, without the
chastened sense that acceptance will turn upon good judgment as well as procedure.”241
In sum, given the constitutional ambiguity in the roles of the political branches on
certain foreign affairs issues, and the presence of significant structural safeguards to
protect each political branch’s interest, the benefits of judicial intervention in foreign
affairs issues are likely to be relatively low, if not non-existent. Although judicial
intervention might provide some modicum of finality and definitiveness to unsettled
foreign affairs controversies, it is not clear that this outcome would be preferable to the
status quo. In any event, any such benefits from judicial intervention would very likely be
outweighed by the costs.
B.

Demarking the Scope of Judicial Abstention in Foreign Affairs

This section employs the balance of institutional competencies approach to
understand the interaction between judicial deference and abstention in foreign affairs
cases. More specifically, this section argues that these two doctrinal offshoots are
interrelated in a way that reflects differences in degree and not of kind. Once this
relationship is recognized, the contours of judicial abstention and deference in foreign
affairs become much more coherent. The section concludes by exploring certain examples
where the approach would help resolve the incoherence in the current judicial approach
to foreign affairs controversies.
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The Relationship between Judicial Abstention and Deference

In foreign relations, the doctrines of judicial abstention and deference are often
addressed under separate rubrics. For instance, in abstaining from foreign affairs, courts
usually invoke the laundry list of factors from the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v.
Carr, but hardly ever mention these factors in the deference context. Moreover, certain
commentators sometimes treat abstention and deference as almost being in irreconcilable
tension with one another, since abstention connotes no judicial involvement in the
dispute, whereas deference suggests that the court will at least reach the merits of the
dispute.242 There are some exceptions to this view. For instance, at least one commentator
has argued that much of the judicial role in foreign affairs can be viewed through the
prism of the Chevron deference in administrative law.243 Not much academic commentary
has focused, however, on the explicit interaction between abstention and deference when
courts adjudicate on constitutional foreign affairs controversies.
The balance of institutional competencies model suggests that in the context of
constitutional foreign affairs controversies, the doctrines of abstention and deference
simply reflect differences in degree, rather than differences in kind. This approach does
not in any way suggest a radical departure from current doctrine. In many ways, a
disjointed patchwork of Supreme Court cases already acknowledges this relationship
between abstention and deference, albeit in a jumbled and disjointed manner. For
instance, in Regan v. Wald, the Court explained the need for judicial deference to the
President’s decision to restrict travel to Cuba on the grounds that foreign affairs matters
“‘are largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference,’”244 which is the same rationale
that courts often use to justify abstention on foreign affairs issues under the political
question doctrine.
Some of the Court’s exclusion and deportation cases also suggest a more explicit
linkage between judicial abstention and deference in foreign affairs. The Court has
observed, for instance, that the power to deport and exclude aliens involves matters of
foreign affairs that are largely exempt from judicial inquiry.245 Although the Court
recognized that the political question doctrine did not necessarily apply because these
cases involved individual rights claims, it nonetheless applied the doctrine’s prudential
factors in concluding that it was up to the political branches, and not the courts, to
decide whether the relevant deportations or exclusions were reasonably related to
national security interests.246
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Viewing the doctrines of deference and abstention through the prism of the
balance of institutional competencies model has distinct advantages. Most importantly, it
helps to distinguish those foreign affairs controversies that merit judicial abstention, as
opposed to those that merit judicial deference. In controversies regarding the
constitutional allocation of foreign affairs powers disputes, for instance, the level of
deference the courts accord the political branches should be absolute because, as
demonstrated in the previous section, the underlying foreign affairs powers are not clearly
amenable to judicial definition. Moreover, when the judicial branch faces allocation of
foreign affairs powers disputes, it operates at the intersection of two areas where its
institutional strengths are at its lowest ebb: foreign affairs and the separation of powers.247
On the other hand, absolute deference would be inappropriate for issues within
the judicial branch’s traditional bailiwick, such as individual rights or the construction of
statutory and treaty provisions. Nevertheless, even in claims where individual rights are
pitted against foreign policy issues, the model suggests that the courts should still accord
the political branches substantial deference. Such deference strikes a fine balance
between the relative institutional incompetence of the courts in foreign affairs matters
and their institutional superiority over the political branches in resolving individual rights
claims.
2.

Some Implications of the Approach in Contemporary Foreign Affairs Disputes

Much of the current judicial approach in foreign affairs is already leaning towards
a balance of institutional competencies approach.248 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s
failure to articulate such an approach explicitly means that the contours of judicial
abstention in foreign affairs remain incoherent. To resolve the current confusion in how
the political question doctrine is applied in foreign affairs, the Court should take the extra
step of generalizing this approach to all constitutional foreign affairs questions.
Below are two illustrations where the model would contribute towards
eliminating confusion in the current judicial approach to foreign affairs controversies: (1)
the resolution of individual rights claims that directly challenge foreign policy decisions;
(2) where Congress has legislated on constitutional foreign affairs issues that courts
normally abstain from under the political question doctrine. The first example also
examines the application of the model to the President’s ongoing efforts to combat
international terrorism in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001.
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Foreign Policy versus Individual Rights

Although forays by the courts into foreign affairs are infrequent, the courts have
not hesitated to adjudicate on the merits of claims with foreign affairs implications when
individual rights or domestic property interests are at stake.249 But even when the courts
reach the merits of such claims, they nonetheless accord the political branches a
significant amount of deference. The courts’ deference in such controversies is most
pronounced in those cases where the President and Congress act in concert. In his famous
concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case, Justice Jackson concluded that in such
circumstances the President “personif[ies] the federal sovereignty” and “[h]is actions
would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might
attack it.”250 Adopting this framework, the courts have essentially blessed joint decisions
by the political branches that intrude on individual rights without much analysis as to
whether the government had even demonstrated a compelling justification for such
actions.251
In many respects, the high degree of deference that the courts grant the political
branches in such disputes accords with what a balance of institutional competencies
model would predict, especially in those circumstances where the political branches are
acting in coordination. For instance, although Justice Jackson’s famous tripartite
framework speaks mainly to executive authority, the flipside of that framework also
suggests a discernible spectrum of judicial authority in constitutional foreign affairs
controversies. At the peak of such judicial competence, where the President acts in
opposition to the will of Congress in a controversy that pits individual rights against
foreign affairs, the judicial branch would apply the same level of scrutiny as it does in
249
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routine domestic constitutional disputes. At the middle range, where Congress and the
President are acting in concert, the judicial branch would accord the political branches’
determination a significant amount of deference. At its lowest ebb, such as when the
constitutional controversy only involves a dispute over the allocation of foreign affairs
authority, the judicial branch would abstain completely from the dispute.252
In any event, the notion that the choice between judicial abstinence or judicial
deference should turn on the comparative institutional competence of the courts
illuminates many settings where the judicial branch faces dilemmas regarding its role in
foreign affairs disputes.
One prime example where this approach would be helpful in resolving current
doctrinal incoherence involves those cases where an individual rights claim directly
challenges a particular foreign policy decision. For instance, the courts have ruled that
they will not review individual rights claims that challenge the wisdom of a foreign policy,
as opposed to its implementation. Many of the cases confronting this issue have
demonstrated, however, that this wisdom versus implementation dichotomy is untenable.
Consider Dickson v. Ford,253 in which the Fifth Circuit refused to entertain an
Establishment Clause challenging a statute that authorized military assistance to Israel. In
invoking the political question doctrine, the court held that the challenge to the statute
constituted “a challenge to the power of the President and Congress to conduct the
foreign affairs of the United States.”254 In other words, to adjudicate on the merits of the
claim, the court held that it would have to examine issues clearly beyond the competence
of the judiciary, such as the wisdom of maintaining a balance of forces in the Middle East
and Israel’s self defense capacity.255 By declining to review the claims in Dickson, the Fifth
Circuit suggested that styling a claim as an individual rights violation would not remedy
the institutional incapacity that the courts face when they handle foreign policy issues.
252
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By contrast, various courts have entertained suits where the courts concluded that
the challenge was not directed at the wisdom of the underlying foreign affairs policy, but
at how such a policy was implemented. For example, in Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc. v. Agency for International Development,256 the Second Circuit held as
justiciable an Establishment Clause challenge to the Agency for International
Development’s (“AID”) implementation of a program that required the United States to
withhold funding from foreign non-governmental organizations that funded abortions. In
that case, the Second Circuit acknowledged that while courts are generally incompetent
to review the policy choices made by the political branches, “it is a court’s duty to
determine whether the political branches in exercising their powers, have ‘chosen a
constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power.”257 Because the court
concluded that the particular method that AID had chosen to implement its policy
mandate was different from the underlying foreign policy itself, the Second Circuit ruled
that the challenge to the constitutionality of that method did not implicate the political
question doctrine.258 Employing a similar distinction between policy and implementation,
courts have held as justiciable challenges to AID’s method of administering funds to
foreign religious schools,259 as well as to whether the United States military could run
exercises on an American citizen’s property in Honduras where such property had not
been lawfully appropriated.260
Categorizing the issue of judicial abstention in these disputes into a policy versus
implementation template does not make much sense. Indeed, in many circumstances, the
implementation versus policy framework would prove to be a false dichotomy. In the case
of the AID program that was litigated in Planed Parenthood, for instance, one might argue
that any challenge to the implementation of the policy would necessarily also be a
challenge to the underlying wisdom of the policy.261 Moreover, casting a political branch
decision as involving policy wisdom rather than policy implementation may not
necessarily diminish the gravity of the alleged constitutional injury. Assume, for instance,
that Congress passes a statute banning foreign aid to all non-Christian nations. Would it
really matter what method the agency responsible for administering the statute chose to
implement its mandate? Depending on the nature of the alleged constitutional injury in a
particular dispute, it may be largely irrelevant. Finally, if as suggested in Dickson, the
256
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objection to judicial intervention in adjudicating the wisdom of foreign policy decisions
involves the lack the judicial competence,262 it is not clear how the courts are any more
institutionally competent to adjudicate disputes concerning the implementation of such
decisions.
Under the balance of institutional competencies model, the courts would not
abstain from any controversy that presents a “bona fide” individual rights claim even if it
purports to challenge the “wisdom” of a foreign policy determination. In such cases, the
courts would not adjudicate on the underlying wisdom of the foreign policy, but would
simply balance the foreign policy (either its wisdom or implementation) against the
individual rights at stake. The courts could then accommodate the political branches’
comparative institutional competence over foreign affairs issue by according the judgment
of the political branches a significant amount of deference.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the courts have also been confronted
with a series of cases that set individual rights claims against national security concerns.263
Interestingly, the courts have implicitly embraced a balance of institutional competencies
approach in reviewing those post-September 11 cases challenging the executive branch’s
authority to detain United States citizens suspected of terrorist activities without
providing them access to counsel.264 The government has argued that the courts should
abstain from hearing these cases because they involve sensitive matters of national
security and foreign policy. The courts that have considered this argument have rejected
it, but have nonetheless concluded that considerable deference to the political branches
judgment was appropriate.265 Although these courts did not explicitly address the
relationship between judicial deference and abstention, at least one of the decisions
seemed to assume that the scope of deference was directly linked to whether individual
rights were implicated.266 All these cases may be understood to hold that the courts have
an obligation to adjudicate on foreign affairs issues that involve individual rights claims,
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but with the appropriate deference to the political branches, especially when the political
branches are acting in coordination.267
b.

Judicial Construction of Statutes that Implicate Foreign Policy

Finally, one last area where the courts have also declined to apply the political
question doctrine is where the resolution of the foreign policy dispute turns on the
interpretation of a statute, treaty, or administrative procedure.268 The balance of
institutional competencies model suggests that courts should review these controversies,
not necessarily because they have special expertise in the substantive foreign policy issues
involved, but because the political branches have acknowledged and accepted the risk of
the courts’ institutional incompetence in enacting the specific statutory or treaty
provision. Judicial construction of such statutes presents a challenge, however, especially
where Congress legislates in an area previously held non-justiciable under the political
question doctrine.
A prime illustration of this difficulty involves the cases challenging the legality of
executive branch’s war-making activities under the War Powers Resolution.269 Congress
enacted this Resolution over Presidents Nixon’s veto in 1973 in order to impose statutory
limits on the President’s war-making powers.270 In a flurry of cases since the Resolution
was passed, however, the courts have invoked the political question doctrine in refusing
to resolve disputes arising under the Resolution.271
Were the courts correct in applying the political question disputes to these
controversies? The answer turns on whether a court decides that in resolving the
statutory claims, it would also have to resolve the constitutionality of the Resolution. On
one view, the courts should approach the Resolution as they would any other legislation
and adjudicate the issue on the merits. In other words, nothing under the model would
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prevent a judicial resolution of the issue since it simply involves a question as to whether
the executive branch’s action was legal under the relevant statute. And while there may
still be very strong prudential reasons for the courts to avoid interjecting themselves into
this kind of dispute, they can avail themselves of other judicial avoidance techniques that
are less drastic than the political question doctrine. Take Campbell v. Clinton, for
instance, a case where certain members of Congress argued that a presidential order
directing airstrikes against Yugoslavia conflicted with the War Powers Resolution.272
Rather than abstaining under the political question doctrine, the federal appeals court
concluded that claimants lacked standing to bring a claim under the Resolution because
their votes were not nullified by the President’s action.273 Citing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Raines v. Byrd,274 the court held that the congressmen could not be injured
where alternative legislative remedies were still available.275
The judicial avoidance device chosen by the Campbell court is hardly unusual. In
the pre-Raines era, for instance, courts could invoke the doctrine of remedial discretion to
abstain from cases brought by legislators challenging the propriety of executive branch
action.276 Like the doctrine of legislative standing under Raines, remedial discretion was a
device for avoiding judicial involvement in political branch disputes in the absence of a
constitutional “impasse” by the political branches.277 As the trial court’s decision in
Campbell observed, after Raines v. Byrd, legislative standing replaced the court’s previous
remedial discretion jurisprudence.278
On a more expansive view of the political question doctrine, however, one could
argue that a judicial intervention in a controversy under the Resolution might require the
court to determine first whether the Resolution is constitutional, and that determination
might implicate the political question doctrine. This position appears to be the one taken
by the court in Ange v. Bush, which ruled that a challenge to the legality of the President’s
deployment of troops during the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis was non-justiciable under the
political question doctrine.279 Under the balance of institutional competencies model,
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however, the Ange scenario would only become relevant if the President actually
challenged the constitutionality of the Resolution. In the absence of such a challenge, the
model suggests that the court should presume the constitutionality of the Resolution and
resolve the dispute on the merits as if it were any other statutory claim.280
CONCLUSION
With the modern ascendancy of judicial hegemony in constitutional
interpretation, it has become fashionable to argue that judicial abstention in foreign
affairs controversies is no longer necessary. But these arguments fail to recognize the
inherent uniqueness of most foreign affairs controversies. This uniqueness has justified
judicial abstention and deference on foreign affairs issues since the early days of the
Republic, and contemporary developments do not suggest that the factors that counsel
judicial restraint in this realm have become any less relevant. On the contrary, the
political branches’ distinct features and resources suggest that they continue to have
institutional advantages over the courts in policing and interpreting the contours of the
foreign affairs powers.
On the other hand, however, not all cases that implicate foreign affairs warrant
judicial abstention. In certain contexts, such as where individual rights are implicated, or
where Congress has legislated in the relevant foreign policy area, judicial intervention is
appropriate, albeit with significant deference to the political branches. Such an approach
accords with the notion that the scope of judicial involvement in foreign affairs should
turn on the balance of institutional competencies of the various branches. In such a
framework, judicial abstention and deference do not entail mutually exclusive categories,
but rather reflect a continuum of judicial involvement in foreign affairs. For instance, in
the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, courts have had to
confront cases that required them to balance the national security prerogative of the
executive branch against the individual rights claims of terrorist suspects. These cases
seem to embrace a balance of institutional competencies framework, although in a
disjointed and incoherent manner. The courts should take the extra step and make this
approach explicit in order to remove much of the confusion and inconsistency that has
marred the judicial role in foreign affairs controversies.
Readers with comments may address them to:
Jide Nzelibe
Assistant Professor
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